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INTRODUCTION
A Norwegian County has ruled that smoking in the workplace is a ba-
sic human right, rejecting a ban introduced in one town on municipal em-
ployees ....
Since January 1, municipal employees in Levanger in central Norway
had been banned from smoking during work hours, both on or off town
property and even when they were on breaks, business trips abroad or
travelling in their own cars on business.
Three members of Levanger's city council appealed the municipal by-
law and regional officials found that the by-law violated citizens' right to
a private life, as defined by the European Convention on Human
Rights ....
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The ruling came as the Scandinavian country prepares to impose a to-
tal ban on smoking in public places, including bars, restaurants and discos,
on June 1[, 2004].
This news story highlights a problem that has plagued the institu-
tions of the European Convention on Human Rights2 since its effec-
tive date in 1953: What subject matter should fall within the meaning
of "private life" under Article 8 of the Convention so as to be pro-
tected from unjustified governmental interference? The European
Court and (previously) Commission3 of Human Rights have failed, by
some commentators' accounts, to provide sufficient guidance on the
subject. To some, the "Commission's practice concerning the mean-
ing of private life has been distinguished neither by its clarity nor its
discipline,"4 others have called Article 8 "elusive,"' and another has
observed that "some decision as to interpretation or an agreed defini-
tion, however general, is essential to clarify the existing confusion in
the case-law."6 Remarks such as these have arisen in part because the
Convention institutions have largely taken a piecemeal approach to
defining private life, rather than providing a general or exhaustive
definition.
Nevertheless, one can glean from the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights that the Court has been trying in the last sev-
eral years to provide more guidance and perhaps even construct a gen-
eral (albeit non-exhaustive) approach to conceptualizing private life.
Specifically, the Court has on several occasions used a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test as a guide for judging when private life
applies. This article explores this recent trend and highlights some of
the hurdles the Court will have to overcome if it chooses to commit to
1. Smoking a Basic Human Right, PAKISTANI DAILY TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004,
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story19-4-2004_pg6-18 (emphasis added).
2. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S 222, C.E.T.S. 5 [hereinafter Convention]. The Convention currently has
45 member States and is administered by the Council of Europe through various institutions
in Strasbourg, France. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS passim (2004), at http://www.coe.intlTlE/Human-rightsl-
prothr-eng.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2005).
3. The Commission was abolished as a separate institution in November 1998. Proto-
col No. 11 to the Convention, May 11, 1994, pmbl., C.E.T.S. 155 (effective Nov. 1, 1998).
4. DAVID J. HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 305
(1995).
5. LUKE CLEMENTS ET AL., EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS: TAKING A CASE UNDER THE
CONVENTION 176 (2d ed. 1999).
6. Louise Doswald-Beck, The Meaning of the "Right to Respect for Private Life" Un-
der the European Convention on Human Rights, 4 HuM. RTS. L.J. 283, 309 (1983); accord
Michael Ford, Article 8 and the Right to Privacy at the Workplace, in HUMAN RIGHTS AT
WORK 25, 27 (Keith D. Ewing ed., 2000).
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DEFINING PRVATE LIFE UNDER THE ECHR
reasonable expectations as the future measure of private life. Among
other things, I discuss the proper analytical framework for the test and
some lessons learned in the United States (and elsewhere) from its use
of a similar approach. Ultimately, I propose a working thesis under
which the reasonableness of an expectation depends on an empirical
analysis of member-State practices.
This article proceeds in several parts. Part I introduces Article 8
of the Convention and summarizes some of the matters already known
to implicate private life. The reader will learn that the Convention tri-
bunals have through their case-by-case approach recognized two gen-
eral categories of private life. The first category includes information
and matters that should be kept secret or free from publicity, which I
call the privacy component, and the second includes matters that relate
to the development and fulfillment of a person's personality or auton-
omy, which I refer to as the personal choice component. Part II then
discusses the emergence in 1997 of a "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" test in some of the Court's opinions as a guide for determining
whether the privacy component of private life applies. Four cases are
discussed and critiqued, closing with the Court's most recent pro-
nouncement on the matter in von Hannover v. Germany.7 I conclude
in the first part of my thesis that, despite some signs of trepidation in
these cases, the Court appears eager to explore reasonable expecta-
tions as the possible benchmark in future cases.
Part 111 then proposes that if the "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" test is to be the foundation for future analyses of private life, the
test should be expanded to include personal choice claims and, more
importantly, be based on objective and empirical indicia. The Court
could analyze all private-life cases with some species of the following
principle: A public authority may not without proper justification in-
terfere with or fail to respect matters in which a person has a reason-
able expectation of privacy or personal choice. But this statement is
simply a shorthand for my second thesis. Before the Court may hold
that an expectation is reasonable, the Court must find, at a minimum,
an emerging consensus among the member States of the Convention
(as determined by legal and societal norms) that recognizes the prima
facie right of privacy or personal choice invoked by the applicant.
Boiled down to its essential characteristics, private life means what a
majority of the member States say it means.
7. 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (2005).
20051
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I. INTRODUCTION TO ARTICLE 8 AND PRIVATE LIFE
Article 8 states in its entirety:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a de-
mocratic society in the interest of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
fights and freedoms of others.8
In the first two parts of this introduction to Article 8 and private
life, I will describe how the Court determines if a State has violated
Article 8 and summarize some of the interpretative methods the Court
utilizes. After painting this backdrop, I then discuss how the Conven-
tion tribunals have defined private life before the appearance of the
reasonable-expectations test in the case law. An understanding of
these subjects will help shed light on how the test should operate in
the future, and I will refer to them often during the course of this arti-
cle.
A. The Court's Approach to Finding an Article 8 Violation
The Court employs a three-step analysis to determine whether a
member State has violated Article 8.9 First the Court decides whether
Article 8 applies by analyzing whether the case involves private life,
family life, home, or correspondence. The bulk of my article relates
to this step (and therefore more won't be said about it here). If an ap-
plication involves any one of the triggering rights, the Court then de-
cides in the second step whether a public authority has (1) interfered
with that right or (2) failed to take steps to protect that right. The first
class of cases invokes the negative obligation of Article 8-i.e., gov-
ernments must ordinarily refrain from interfering with a person's
rights-whereas the second class invokes a positive obligation, i.e.,
governments must sometimes take positive steps to "respect" or pro-
8. Convention, supra note 2, art. 8.
9. For a description of the Court's procedural requirements for bringing a claim under
the Convention, see Kevin Boyle, Council of Europe, OSCE, and European Union, in GUIDE
TO INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RiGHTs PRACTICE 143, 143-70 (Hurst Hannum ed., 4th ed. 2004).
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tect a person's rights under Article 8 (such as from interference by
private actors).' 0
In the third step, the Court asks whether the State's acts or omis-
sions in a particular case are justified. The route taken here depends
on the nature of the alleged transgression. In negative-obligation
cases, the Court applies Article 8(2) and analyzes whether the State's
actions (1) complied with its own laws, (2) pursued one or more of the
exhaustive, legitimate aims listed in paragraph 2, and (3) can be re-
garded as necessary in a democratic society to accomplish the aim(s)
pursued. In positive-obligation cases, the analysis differs slightly be-
cause Article 8(2) by its own terms is inapposite. The Court therefore
employs a balancing test that uses the aims in Article 8(2) as a non-
exhaustive guide and measures "the competing interests of the indi-
vidual [against the interests] of the community as a whole."" Other-
wise, the examination here resembles the analysis performed in nega-
tive-obligation cases.
Lastly, in measuring the purported justifications in all cases, "the
State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation [or discretion] in deter-
mining the steps to be taken to ensure compliance with the Conven-
tion."' 2 Because of "their direct and continuous contact with the vital
forces of their countries, State authorities are in principle in a better
position than the international judge to give an opinion on the... 'ne-
cessity' of a 'restriction' or 'penalty. ' 1 3 The discretion given to na-
tional authorities varies according to the circumstances, however. For
example, when a consensus exists on an issue among the laws of the
Convention States, then "the margin of appreciation will be narrow
and deviation from it will be difficult to justify."' 4 The opposite holds
true, however, if on that issue "customs, policies and practices vary
considerably between contracting states."' 5 In addition to the exis-
tence of a consensus, the Court will consider other factors such as
whether the case involves intimate matters, positive obligations, ur-
gent measures, or national security. 6 In a sense, the margin of appre-
10. See Convention, supra note 2, art. 8(1); Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) 31 (1979).
11. Powell v. United Kingdom, 172 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 41 (1990); see also Hatton
v. United Kingdom, 2003-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 189, 7 98.
12. Powell, 172 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 41.
13. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 9 48-49 (1976).
14. URSULA KILKELLY, THE RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND FAMILY LIFE 7 (2001).
15. Id. at 8.
16. See, e.g., YurAKA ARAi-TAKAHASHi, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND
THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR 82-86 (2002); IAIN
CAMERON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 96-97 (4th
2005]
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ciation resembles an appellate standard of review that varies in sever-
ity according to the circumstances.
B. The Court's Methods of Interpretation
Also important to an understanding of this article are some of the
interpretative methods the Court employs to inject meaning into words
and phrases of the Convention. The most prominent of these princi-
ples may be grouped as follows: textual interpretation in light of ob-
ject and purpose, dynamic interpretation, and autonomous interpreta-
tion. The Court draws the first principle from the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, which states that words and phrases must be
interpreted according to their ordinary meaning and in light of the ob-
ject and purpose of the treaty they are found in.17 The principal object
and purpose of the Convention are to "maintain and promote the ide-
als and values of a democratic society," 18 and the emphasis placed on
these aims "has led the Court, on many occasions, to adopt a fairly
progressive or activist approach."19
For related reasons, the Court also interprets the Convention dy-
namically, i.e., as a living instrument in which the meaning of terms
may change over time depending on societal views. 20 As was recently
stated: "This evolutive approach towards interpretation of the Con-
vention implies that the Commission and the Court take into account
contemporary realities and attitudes, not the situation prevailing at the
time of the drafting of the Convention in 1949-1950. "21 Judge Lou-
caides has noted that application of this canon also "promises that new
rights derived from the notion of 'private life' will continually be rec-
ognized whenever required by the conditions of social life. 22
ed. 2002); HOWARD C. YOuROw, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS
OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE passim (1996).
17. May 23, 1969, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; see
also Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 29 (1975).
18. Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A) 119 (1991); see also CLARE
OVEY & ROBIN C.A. WHITE, JACOBS & WHITE: EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
34-35 (3d ed. 2002).
19. PIETER VAN DUK & GODEFRIDUS J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 73-74 (3d ed. 1998).
20. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 4, at 7.
21. VAN DUK & VAN HOOF, supra note 19, at 77-78; see also ANDREW DRZEMCZEWSKI,
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND FAMILY LIFE, HOME AND
CORRESPONDENCE 17 (1984).
22. LouKIs G. LOUCAIDES, Personality and Privacy Under the European Convention on
Human Rights, in ESSAYS ON THE DEVELOPING LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 83, 86 (1995).
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Lastly, some concepts and "terms used in [the Convention] are
considered to have a special, autonomous meaning, which is inde-
pendent from, and does not necessarily correspond to, the meaning
which identical or similar terms may have in the domestic law of the
Contracting States. 23 This primarily means that the Court can choose
to ignore the respondent State's interpretation or classification of a
particular term.24 Less clear, however, is whether, and to what extent,
this canon should limit the Court from relying on the positions of
other contracting States to reach an "autonomous" interpretation.
Some scholars argue that the Court should not rely on domestic prac-
tices.25 But others have noted (correctly in my view) that "a totally
autonomous interpretation could be seen as illegitimate" 26 and that "it
is difficult to see how an autonomous meaning can be arrived at...
except by reference to national systems of classification. '27 This point
of contention exemplifies the tug of war between the desire to main-
tain independent, European-level control and the desire to remain
rooted in the "common heritage" of the member States.28 My proposal
in Part 11 attempts to create the proper balance.
23. VAN DUK & VAN HOOF, supra note 19, at 77.
24. For example, in Engel v. Netherlands, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976), the Court
had to decide whether a governmental proceeding against the applicant fell within the mean-
ing of "criminal charge" under Article 6 so as to entitle the applicant to certain protections
under the Convention. Dutch law had classified the proceeding as "disciplinary," and not
"criminal," but the Court held that the Dutch classification was not dispositive. Id. U 79-85;
see also OVEY & WHITE, supra note 18, at 31-32, 140-43.
25. Yutaka Arai-Takahashi has neatly summarized this argument:
An irony of the comparative method is ... that reliance on national practice among
the majority of Member States might jeopardise the endeavour of the Strasbourg
organs to keep the Convention's standards both autonomous and high .... [I]t is
paradoxical for the supervisory bodies, which are responsible for reviewing the
laws of the Contracting States, to depend on national legislation .... Such an ap-
proach might sacrifice the quality of the Convention standard at the expense of,
and in search of, a "uniform" European approach.
ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 16, at 195-96; see also George Letsas, The Truth in Autono-
mous Concepts: How to Interpret the ECHR, 15 EuR. J. INT'L L. 279, 297-305 (2004) (argu-
ing that a consensus-based approach that refers to domestic practices is inferior to interpreta-
tion by reference to "moral truth").
26. Frangois Ost, The Original Canons of Interpretation of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION VERSUS NATIONAL RESTRICTIONS 283, 305 (Christine Chod-
kiewicz trans., Mireille Delmas-Marty ed., 1992).
27. JOHN G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 71-72 (1993).
28. Ost, supra note 26, at 305-09; see also Mireille Delmas-Marty, A "Reasoned" Con-
ception of the Reason of State, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION VERSUS NATIONAL RESTRICTIONS, supra note
26, 281, 281-82.
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C. The Meaning of Private Life
Having covered the procedural aspects of the Convention juris-
prudence, I now turn briefly to some of its substantive rulings. The
objective here is not to chronicle all the cases that have refined and
expanded the meaning of private life over time; scholars have covered
that topic thoroughly elsewhere.2 9 Rather, my goal is merely to give
the reader some indication of the sorts of subject matters the Conven-
tion tribunals have held implicate private life, particularly prior to the
appearance of the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test in some of
the Court's opinions. A review of the case law and academic litera-
ture illustrates that the Court has recognized two main categories of
protection within private life: matters and information that should be
kept secret or free from publicity-labeled here as the privacy compo-
nent; and matters that involve a person's personality or autonomy-
labeled here as the personal choice component.3"
It appears the Convention institutions have always understood
private life to include a privacy component. That is to say, as a gen-
eral principle, Strasbourg has recognized that the right to respect for
private life means at a minimum the right to "live, as far as one
wishes, protected from publicity. ' 3I Hyman Gross has in a different
context characterized this form of informational privacy as "con-
cern[ing] about what of us can become known, and to whom. 32
Many of these sorts of cases have been easy for the Court and Com-
mission to decide, typically because the government acknowledged or
did not contest the private nature of the matter involved. Regrettably,
however, the Convention institutions have not yet provided sufficient
and (more importantly) consistent direction for deciding the tough
cases, thereby leaving what qualifies as "private" to be determined
case by case.33 In that fashion, the Court and Commission have found,
29. E.g., HARRIS ET AL., supra note 4, at 305-12; KILKELLY, supra note 14, at 34-48;
LOUCAIDES, supra note 22, at 85-100; JOHN G. MERRILLS & ARTHUR H. ROBERTSON, HuMAN
RIGHTS IN EUROPE: A STUDY OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 138-44 (4th
ed. 2001); VAN DUK & VAN HOOF, supra note 19, at 491-503.
30. The Convention institutions do not in their opinions expressly separate their analy-
ses into these two categories.
31. X v. Iceland, App. No. 6825/74, 5 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 86, 87 (1976)
(Commission Decision).
32. Hyman Gross, Privacy and Autonomy, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY 169, 172 (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971).
33. This is not a problem unique to Convention case law. Courts and commentators
have struggled for years to define the contours of privacy, with some endeavoring to draw
bright-line rules and others mere guidelines. For an excellent and current summary of several
scholarly conceptions of privacy, see Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L.
8
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by way of example, that the following matters implicate the privacy
aspect of Article 8: a person's (1) H1V status; (2) medical records; (3)
childhood behavioral history; and (4) original gender identification in
transsexual cases.34
Most of the activity in the case law has related to the personality
or autonomy component of private life. The Commission first moved
in that direction in X v. Iceland,35 in which the applicant challenged a
regulation prohibiting him from keeping a dog in his home. In reject-
ing the challenge, the Commission stated:
[T]he right to respect for private life does not end [at the right to privacy,
i.e., the right to live, as far as one wishes, protected from publicity]. It
comprises also, to a certain degree, the right to establish and to develop re-
lationships with other human beings, especially in the emotional field for
the development and fulfillment of one's own personality.
36
As a result of that statement, and the many decisions that have re-
lied on it since, scholars have accepted that the concept of personality
has become an additional point of analysis of private life. 37 More re-
cently, the Court has elaborated that "the notion of personal autonomy
[also] is an important principle underlying the interpretation of [Arti-
cle 8's] guarantees. 38 Once again, however, the Court has not de-
fined personality or autonomy (or outlined their boundaries) and has
instead ruled on the matter in a piecemeal fashion. Among others, the
Court and Commission have found the following matters to involve
what I label henceforth as the personal choice39 component of private
REv. 1087, 1099-1124 (2002). See also Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89
YALE L.J. 421,424-56 (1980).
34. See respectively Z v. Finland, 1997-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 323; Martin v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 27533/95, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. CDll2 (1996) (Commission Decision); Gaskin v.
United Kingdom, 160 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989); B v. France, 232-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1992).
35. App. No. 6825/74, 5 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 86 (1976) (Commission Deci-
sion).
36. Id. at 87. The Commission ultimately found Article 8 inapplicable because the case
did not involve a human relationship. Id. I question whether the outcome of the applicability
analysis would have remained the same, however, had the Commission applied the test pro-
posed in Part III of this article and framed the issue as whether (without reference to any pur-
ported justifications offered by the government for the restriction) the majority of member
States would expect that the decision to keep a dog as a house pet is a matter of personal
choice.
37. LoucAmES, supra note 22, at 99, 106-07.
38. Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-rn Eur. Ct. H.R. 155, 61. But see David
Feldman, The Developing Scope of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
1997 EuR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 265, 273 (1997) ("[T]he idea of private life must not stretch to
the point at which it subsumes other autonomy-related rights and loses its rationale.").
39. I will through the remainder of this article use the label personal choice, instead of
2005]
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life: a person's (1) surname; (2) sexual lifestyle; (3) clothing; (4)
medical treatment; (5) sexual integrity; and (6) physical integrity.40
In spite of the case-by-case approaches noted above, or perhaps
because of them, some opinions from the Strasbourg Court have re-
cently moved toward a better framework for deciding the privacy
cases, namely by gauging the applicant's reasonable expectations. I
review that trend in the next section.
II. THE APPEARANCE OF REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS AS A GUIDE FOR
DEFINING THE PRIVACY COMPONENT OF PRIVATE LIFE
The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test has appeared as a
guide for assessing the privacy component of private life in five re-
ported judgments of the Court, starting in 1997 and continuing
through 2004. I discuss four of those judgments here. As will be seen
in the sections that follow, the test features prominently in the first and
fourth cases, with some members of the Court even writing separately
in the most recent case to advocate its adoption on a grander scale, but
appears more as background noise in the others, perhaps due to unease
or unfamiliarity in its use. (This latter fact does not surprise me given
the test's relative infancy at the Court.) Although the test has not yet
appeared in a case as the sole basis to judge private life, it can be said
that the Court nevertheless appears eager to explore reasonable expec-
tations as the possible benchmark in future cases.4'
"personality" or "autonomy," as the Court has, because personal choice conveys these ideas
in a way more comprehensible to lay people. Further, the proposal offered in Part IIn would
be awkward with the "personality" label. You could try asking someone if they have an "ex-
pectation of personality" in something, but I frankly doubt they would have any idea what you
were talking about. Although "autonomy" is less awkward than "personality," an "expecta-
tion of personal choice" still makes better sense.
40. See respectively Burghartz v. Switzerland, 280-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994);
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981); McFeeley v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 8317178, 20 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 44 (1980) (Commission Decision);
Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 244 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992); X & Y v. Netherlands, 91 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1985); Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, 247-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1993).
41. I should note here for those who are unfamiliar with the Court's practices that the
Court does not strictly follow the doctrine of stare decisis. Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 35 (1990). Therefore, the fact the Court has used the reasonable-
expectations test to help resolve some cases does not compel it to use the test in others. Nev-
ertheless, the Court often follows its own precedents because such a course is "in the interests
of legal certainty and the orderly development of the Convention case-law." Id.
10
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After first describing the origins of the reasonable-expectations
test outside Strasbourg, I discuss in chronological order the four Con-
vention judgments pertinent here. Along the way, I flag various issues
the Court will have to clarify should it choose in the future to employ
reasonable expectations as the sole basis for judging private life.
A. Origins of the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" Test
The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test (or at least some spe-
cies of it) almost certainly originated as a doctrine in the U.S. Su-
preme Court's 1967 decision Katz v. United States.42 There, the Su-
preme Court had to decide what circumstances would trigger an
individual's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable govern-
ment searches and seizures. Not unlike Article 8, the Fourth Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution states that the "right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... ,143 "Central to an
understanding of the Fourth Amendment ... is a perception of what
police activities, under what circumstances and infringing upon what
areas and interests, constitute either a search or a seizure within the
meaning of [the] Amendment." 44 In Katz, the Supreme Court departed
from earlier case law that had focused on the involvement of one or
more of the items listed in the Amendment (houses, papers, etc.) as
demonstrating its applicability45 and instead held that a person seeking
to invoke the Amendment must show an actual and reasonable46 ex-
pectation of privacy in the place or object at issue.47 In cases in which
the Amendment applies, U.S. courts then ask, much as is done under
Article 8(2) of the Convention, whether the government's search or
seizure was unreasonable under the circumstances.
The Katz decision has influenced courts outside the United States
and areas outside criminal law. For example, Canada has adopted the
42. 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see also People v. Morgan, 16 Cal. Rptr. 838, 840 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1961) (possibly stating an earlier claim).
43. U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.
44. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1, at 422 (4th ed. 2004).
45. See id. § 2.1 (a), at 431 (describing earlier case law).
46. Over the years the Supreme Court has used the terms "justifiable" and "legitimate"
interchangeably with "reasonable." Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
47. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 31-41 (2001). For example, merely showing that the government seized papers from
a house would no longer suffice to trigger the Fourth Amendment. Instead, the defendant
would have to demonstrate she had an actual and reasonable expectation of privacy in those
papers.
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Katz reasonable-expectations approach as the means by which to ana-
lyze its Fourth Amendment analogue, Section 8 of the Canadian Char-
ter of Rights and Freedoms;4 8 the Constitutional Court of South Africa
has used the test to interpret the right to privacy contained in Section
14 of its Constitution;49 a court in Australia has used reasonable ex-
pectations to analyze the legality of drug testing of police officers;50
and Israeli legislation has used the test to evaluate the secret monitor-
ing of conversations.5" Back in the United States, the U.S. Supreme
Court has extended the doctrine to searches of employees for work-
related purposes, among other places,52 and several jurisdictions have
used reasonable expectations as an element of the tort of intrusion of
privacy or seclusion.53 Similarly, the test has appeared in the British
48. Hunter v. Southman Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 158-60; see also R. v. Edwards,
[1996] 1 S.C.R. 128, 139-41; Kate Murray, The "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test"
and the Scope of Protection Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure Under Section 8 of the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 18 OTrAWA L. REV. 25 (1986). Canadian legislation also
incorporated a similar test as early as 1974. See Protection of Privacy Act, 1974, c. 50, §§ 2,
4 (Can.) (defining "private communication" to mean any oral communication or telecommu-
nication "made under circumstances in which it is reasonable for the originator thereof to ex-
pect that it will not be intercepted").
49. Bernstein v. Bester, 1996 (4) BCLR 449 (CC); see also Investigating Directorate:
Serious Economic Offences v. Hyundai Motor Distribs. (Pty) Ltd., 2000 (10) BCLR 1079
(CC); SourH AFRICA LAW REFORM COMM'N, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION §§ 3.2.20,
3.3.8, 3.3.14 (2003), at http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.zalsalcissue/ip24-03.pdf (last visited
Apr. 11, 2005). For a criticism of the expectations approach in South African jurisprudence,
see lain Currie, Some Implications of a Dignity-Based Conception of Privacy, Sept. 9-10,
2004, at http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/workshop/workshopO4/papers2004/currie.pdf.
50. Anderson v. Sullivan, (1997) 78 F.C.R. 380, 398. The State of Victoria also passed
legislation incorporating a similar test in 1969. See Listening Devices Act, 1969, Act No.
7804/1969, § 3 (Vic.) (defining "private conversation" to include any "conversation carried
on in such circumstances as may reasonably indicate that the parties to such conversation de-
sire it to be confined to such parties but does not include a conversation made in any circum-
stances in which the parties to the conversation ought reasonably to expect that the conversa-
tion may be overheard"), repealed and superseded by Surveillance Devices Act, 1999, Act
No. 21/1999, § 3(1) (Vic.) (retaining a similar definition).
51. See Emanuel Gross, The Struggle of a Democracy Against Terrorism-Protection of
Human Rights: The Right to Privacy Versus the National Interest-the Proper Balance, 37
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 27, 60 (2004) ("[T]he [Secret Monitoring] law provides a substantive, ob-jective test: when a person's subjective expectation of privacy (disclosed by his conduct) is
reasonable, i.e., is legitimate in the eyes of the public, his conversations must be monitored in
accordance with rules applicable to monitoring in the private domain.") (citing Secret Moni-
toring Law, 5739-1979, S.H. 938, 118, § 8 (Isr.) (defining "public domain" as "a place where
a reasonable person could have expected that his conversations would be monitored without
his consent")).
52. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 714-19 (1987) and the cases cited therein.
53. E.g., Hoskins v. Howard, 971 P.2d 1135, 1141 (Idaho 1998); Pontbriand v. Sundlun,
699 A.2d 856, 864-65 (R.I. 1997); Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633,
654-55 (Cal. 1994); Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 564 (Utah 1988); M & R Inv. Co. v. Man-
darino, 748 P.2d 488, 493 (Nev. 1987); Vemars v. Young, 539 F.2d 966, 969 (3d Cir. 1976);
Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8
(West 1998).
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Isles and New Zealand as a possible means for judging the laws of
confidence and privacy, although the test's lineage in those instances
cannot always be traced to Katz.54 There is therefore an abundance of
international case law and scholarship on these subjects, and I have
found much of that information to be valuable here (both from a com-
parative and exemplary perspective).55 I would hope the European
Court of Human Rights would also consult these resources, with
whatever circumspection it deems necessary, should it choose to de-
velop reasonable expectations as the yardstick for all future cases.
B. Halford v. United Kingdom
The phrase "reasonable expectation of privacy" first appeared in a
Convention judgment in 1997, in the case of Halford v. United King-
dom.5 6 The applicant, Alison Halford, had worked in 1983 as an As-
sistant Chief Constable with the Merseyside police and was at the time
the highest-ranking female police officer in the United Kingdom.
Over the following seven years, Halford applied several times, unsuc-
cessfully, for a promotion to the rank of Deputy Chief Constable. Be-
lieving the denials were based on a discriminatory motive, she brought
a claim against the Chief Constable for gender discrimination. More
important for our purposes, Halford also alleged that members of her
department had intercepted calls made from "her office telephones...
54. E.g., IRELAND LAW REFORM COMM'N, REPORT ON PRIVACY: SURVEILLANCE AND
INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS passim (1998), available at http://www.lawreform.ie/-
publications/data/Irc99/lrc_99.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2005); REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON PRIVACY AND RELATED MATTERS, Cm. 1102, at 49, 12.17 (1990); A v. B Plc, [20021 2
All E.R. 545, 553-54, W1 1 l(ix)-(x) (Eng. C.A. 2002). The New Zealand Court of Appeal re-
cently recognized a new privacy tort-public disclosure of private facts-in which a required
element is the "existence of facts in respect of which there is a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy." Hosking & Hosking v. Runting, [2005] 1 N.Z.L.R. 1, 117, 249-50 (C.A. 2004).
Furthermore, in his discourse on privacy law in common-law jurisdictions, Raymond Wacks
has similarly proposed that courts and legislatures should define "personal information," a
concept he believes is the crux of privacy, by referring "both to the quality of the information
and to the reasonable expectations of the individual concerning its use." RAYMOND WACKS,
PERSONAL INFORMATION: PRIVACY AND THE LAW 24 (1989); see also id. at 26, 266-67, 279-
80.
55. These various adaptations of the reasonable-expectations test do not always in their
final forms resemble one another (or necessarily the original approach of Katz). Courts out-
side the Fourth Amendment context have often molded the test as required by the circum-
stances. My thesis in Part Ill also departs from Katz and its Fourth Amendment progeny in
several important respects.
56. 1997-111 Eur. Ct H.R. 1004. Four years before Halford, the government of Ireland
used a "reasonable expectation of privacy" test as an argument for why private life did not
apply, but the Commission declared the application inadmissible on exhaustion grounds and
therefore did not reach the issue. E.N. v. Ireland, App. No. 18670/91, 2 (1993) (Commis-
sion Decision), http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2005).
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for the purposes of obtaining information to use against her in the dis-
crimination proceedings."57 After exhausting her domestic remedies,
she complained in Strasbourg that the interceptions implicated her
private life and correspondence in violation of Article 8. The Gov-
ernment countered, however, that the telephone calls "fell outside the
protection of Article 8 because she could have had no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in relation to them. ' 8
The Court began its analysis by citing precedent which holds that
telephone calls made from business premises are covered under both
private life and correspondence.59 Though the Court could have
stopped there, it then employed as an alternative basis the Govern-
ment's proposed "reasonable expectation of privacy" test and again
found that both private life and correspondence applied:
There is no evidence of any warning having been given to Ms Halford,
as a user of the internal telecommunications system operated at the Mer-
seyside police headquarters, that calls made on that system would be liable
to interception. She would, the Court considers, have had a reasonable
expectation of privacy for such calls, which expectation was moreover re-
inforced by a number of factors. As Assistant Chief Constable she had
sole use of her office where there were two telephones, one of which was
specifically designated for her private use. Furthermore, she had been
given the assurance, in response to a memorandum, that she could use her
office telephones for the purposes of her sex-discrimination case. 60
Finding no proper justification for the interference, the Court con-
cluded that the Government had violated Article 8.
The judgment is remarkable, of course, for its first use of the "rea-
sonable expectation of privacy" test.61 But it also highlights two is-
sues that I will discuss further along in this article and that the Court
57. Halford, 1997-I Eur. CL H.R. 17.
58. Id. 1 43 (emphasis added and citation omitted). In its brief to the Court, the Gov-
ernment did not cite any authorities to support its use of the reasonable-expectations test. See
Memorial of the Government, Halford v. United Kingdom, Jan. 2, 1997, at 32, 2.7. It is
therefore not possible to determine whether the Government derived the test from Katz or
elsewhere.
59. Halford, 1997-rI Eur. Ct. H.R. 44. Notably, most of the cases cited by the Court
do not bother to analyze why telephone calls generally fall under both private life and corre-
spondence. See, e.g., Huvig v. France, 176-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 25 (1990); Malone v.
United Kingdom, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) T 64 (1984); Klass v. Germany, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) 41 (1978).
60. Halford, 1997-rI Eur. Ct. H.R. 45 (emphasis added).
61. Its influence in the United Kingdom was almost immediate. Soon after the decision,
the U.K. Press Complaints Commission (PCC) amended its Code of Practice to state "private
places" include either "public or private property where there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy." PRESS COMPL. COMM'N CODE OF PRACTICE § 3 (as amended Jan. 1998),
http://www.pcc.org.ukicop/cop.asp. The PCC's implementation of the test is narrower than
Halford's test, however, because the PCC focuses solely on places.
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will have to address should it decide to employ reasonable expecta-
tions as its benchmark for future cases (regardless of whether the
Court adopts my proposed formulation of the test). The first issue is
whether a person's actual or subjective expectations of privacy are
relevant, or perhaps even required (as is usual in the United States), in
determining whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable. The
Court's reference to the assurances given to Halford, and the lack of
warnings as well, suggests it found her subjective expectations at least
somewhat relevant. Unfortunately, the Court said nothing further on
the matter, thereby inviting the question of whether the outcome
would have differed had Halford's employer posted signs stating it
would monitor and record all telephone calls.61 This is an important
point I will return to in Part Il.D infra, where I argue that actual ex-
pectations should not be required for private life to apply.
The second issue the case raises is whether the Court should use
the reasonable-expectations test to judge the applicability of private
life alone or whether the Court should also use the test to judge the
other rights contained in Article 8, namely family life, home, and cor-
respondence? In Halford the Court seemed to sweep the applicability
of both private life and correspondence under the rubric of reasonable
expectations (similar to the approach in Katz). This suggests the
Court may have intended the reasonable-expectations test to guide the
analysis of both elements-a not entirely unreasonable proposition
given that both elements arguably fall within the private sphere. On
the other hand, the amalgamation may have been inadvertent. In any
event, in Part ILI.E infra, I explain why I believe the Court should
limit the reasonable-expectations test to private life.
C. P.G. & J.H. v. United Kingdom
Four years after Halford, the Court again mentioned the reason-
able-expectations test, this time in P.G. & J.H. v. United Kingdom,63 a
case concerning, among other things, whether the police may covertly
record a conversation between a police officer and a suspect at a po-
lice station to obtain an audio sample of the suspect's voice. The case
began when the police learned that several persons (including one of
the applicants) were planning to rob a cash-collection van. In an ef-
fort to thwart the robbery and identify all the conspirators, the police
62. See John D.R. Craig & Hazel D. Oliver, The Right to Privacy in the Public Work-
place: Should the Private Sector be Concerned?, 27 INDUS. L.J. 49, 55-56 (1998).
63. 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 546.
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installed a covert listening device in an apartment and recorded sev-
eral conversations. Later, the police requested voice exemplars from
the applicants to compare to the voices on the tapes, but the applicants
refused. To obtain the samples, the police then secretly recorded the
applicants at a police station during a charging procedure. 64
Upon reaching the European Court of Human Rights, the appli-
cants argued that the Government had infringed their private lives be-
cause they did not know or have reason to suspect that the police at
the station had recorded their conversations.65 The Government coun-
tered that private life did not apply because the recordings were made
to obtain voice samples (not substantive information) and because the
"aural quality of the applicants' voices was ... a public, external fea-
ture. ' 66 The Court rejected the Government's view. After summariz-
ing some of the matters it has protected under private life in the past,
the Court stated:
There are a number of elements relevant to a consideration of whether
a person's private life is concerned by measures effected outside a per-
son's home or private premises. Since there are occasions when people
knowingly or intentionally involve themselves in activities which are or
may be recorded or reported in a public manner, a person's reasonable
expectations as to privacy may be a significant, although not necessarily
conclusive, factor. [For example,] [a] person who walks down the street
will, inevitably, be visible to any member of the public who is also pre-
sent. Monitoring by technological means of the same public scene (for
example, a security guard viewing through closed-circuit television) is of a
similar character.
6
But the Court then seemed to stress that the important issue in the
case was whether and how the applicants' information was processed:
Private-life considerations may arise, however, once any systematic or
permanent record comes into existence of such material from the public
domain .... The Court has referred in this context to the Council of
Europe's Convention ... for the protection of individuals with regard to
automatic processing of personal data ... whose purpose is "to secure in
the territory of each Party for every individual.., respect for his... right
to privacy, with regard to automatic processing of personal data relating
64. Id. [ 8-9, 12-16.
65. The applicants also complained about the legality of the bug at the apartment and the
use of telephone metering, but the Government did not contest the applicability of private life
in those matters.
66. P.G. & J.H., 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 54.
67. Id. I 57 (emphasis added). The Court's reference in this paragraph to an applicant's
"knowing" or "intentional" involvement in certain activities, suggests, as in Halford, that the
Court might consider an applicant's actual expectations of privacy a relevant or perhaps even
a required component of the reasonable-expectations test. Again, I believe this is the wrong
approach. See infra Part I]I.D.
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to him", such data being defined as "any information relating to an identi-
fied or identifiable individual. 68
With these latter principles in mind, the Court stated that the voice
samples fell within private life: "Though it is true that when being
charged the applicants answered formal questions in a place where po-
lice officers were listening to them, the recording and analysis of their
voices on this occasion must still be regarded as concerning the proc-
essing of personal data about the applicants. 69
It is a little unclear from the Court's opinion whether it intended
the presence of personal data processing alone to be the dispositive is-
sue in all cases or simply another factor to consider in addition to or as
part of an analysis of an applicant's reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy. It would seem to me that some species of the latter reading is
the correct one as otherwise the Court's discussion of reasonable ex-
pectations becomes superfluous. That then invites the follow-up ques-
tion, however, of how reasonable expectations and processing relate to
each other as criteria. Are they independent or is one subsumed
within the other? As I see it, how information is processed and by
whom should simply be a factor to consider, among others, in deter-
mining whether an expectation was reasonable. This follows because
I cannot imagine a situation where the Court would hold that the pri-
vacy component of private life applies-despite the case involving
matters in which an applicant could have no reasonable expectation of
privacy-solely because information was processed. Data processing
alone should not be the dispositive test.
It is thus unfortunate the Court did not frame its conclusion within
the rubric of reasonable expectations. Perhaps the Court felt uncom-
fortable stating, given the public nature of people's voices and where
the samples were taken, that the applicants had reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy. Yet the Court could have stated as much had it rec-
ognized that expectations of privacy can be partial.' The applicants
in P.G. & J.H. could have reasonably expected to retain at least some
degree of privacy in their voices, perhaps expecting that at most only
the people who were present (and whom the applicants were aware of)
might contemporaneously hear and recognize them. They would not,
68. P.G. & J.H., 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. I 57 (emphasis added and citations omitted); see
also Lee A. Bygrave, Data Protection Pursuant to the Right to Privacy in Human Rights
Treaties, 6 INT'L J.L. & INFo. TECH. 247 (1998) (discussing the extent to which Article 8 em-
braces the principles and guarantees found in data protection laws).
69. P.G. & J.H., 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 59.
70. This is an important point I will return to in Part ILI.B infra.
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however, have foreseen the sort of electronic recording and analysis
(i.e., data processing) that occurred. 71 As I believe this is the proper
way to conceptualize this scenario, my proposal in Part III accommo-
dates and encourages the partial-expectations approach, namely
through the proper construction of an applicant's claim. 72
D. Peck v. United Kingdom
The Court next mentioned the "reasonable expectation of privacy"
test in Peck v. United Kingdom.7 3 There, a city's public-surveillance
system contemporaneously observed and recorded the applicant on a
public road attempting suicide with a knife. On account of the sur-
veillance, police were able to respond to the scene, stop the applicant,
and give him medical assistance. The city issued a press release soon
after the incident touting that its surveillance system had helped pre-
vent a potentially dangerous situation; the release included two still
video images of the applicant holding the knife. The images later
made their way into local newspapers and ultimately appeared, along
with some of the surveillance footage, on a BBC television show
called Crime Beat, where friends and family of the applicant recog-
nized him. 74 When the case reached the European Court of Human
Rights, the principal issue was whether private life applied. The Gov-
ernment argued it did not because the "[d]isclosure of those actions
simply distributed a public event to a wider public and could not
change the public quality of the applicant's original conduct and ren-
der it more private. '7 The applicant countered that the relevant foot-
age related to an attempted suicide and he was unaware he was being
filmed. Importantly, the applicant did not complain about the surveil-
lance per se (as it had helped save his life); rather, "he took issue with
71. Incidentally, the U.S. Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion on similar
facts in its Fourth Amendment case United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973). There, the
Supreme Court held that "[n]o person can have a reasonable expectation that others will not
know the sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably expect that his face will be a
mystery to the world." Id. at 14. For other examples of the Supreme Court's rejection of par-
tial expectations of privacy in the Fourth Amendment context, see infra note 111.
72. For the sake of completeness, I should also briefly mention the Court's subsequent
judgment in Perry v. United Kingdom, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 141, which resembled P.G. &
J.H. in facts and outcome with the exception that it involved the covert videotaping of a sus-
pect at a police station. Because the reasoning in Perry differs little from P.G. & J.H., par-
ticularly in how it deals with reasonable expectations, I do not discuss Perry here. For a
summary of the case, see Andy Roberts, Covert Video Identification: European Convention
on Human Rights, Article 8, 67 J. CRIM. L. 480 (2003).
73. 2003-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 123.
74. Id. IN 10-21.
75. Id. [53.
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the disclosure by the [city] of the CCTV material which resulted in the
relevant publications and broadcasts."76
The Court began its analysis by quoting verbatim from the pas-
sage in P.G. & J.H. that discusses the "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" test.77 But the Court then discussed other factors that are impor-
tant in determining whether "public" activities become private for
purposes of Article 8 that, like P.G. & J.H., principally rely on
whether and how personal data was processed.7 8 Performing the nec-
essary review, the Court found that private life applied because "the
relevant moment was viewed to an extent which far exceeded any ex-
posure to a passer-by or to security observation ... and to a degree
surpassing that which the applicant could possibly have foreseen when
he walked in [the city on the date in question]."79 Again, what is re-
markable about this case is that despite the apparent allegiance to data
processing as the proper framework for analysis, the actual analysis of
the Court seems more akin to one involving degrees of reasonable ex-
pectations of privacy.8" The applicant could reasonably expect that his
activities would be private to a certain extent (visible, perhaps, only to
people who happened to pass by). He would not expect or foresee,
however, the sort of use and disclosure that occurred.8 So although
the applicant cannot claim an absolute expectation of privacy, he can
claim a partial one.82
E. von Hannover v. Germany
The Court's most recent and arguably significant judgment in this
area is von Hannover v. Germany,83 a case involving the often-
76. Id. 154.
77. Id. 158.
78. Id. [ 59-61.
79. Id. 162.
80. For a similar reading of the case, see Gavin Phillipson, Transforming Breach of
Confidence? Towards a Common Law Right of Privacy Under the Human Rights Act, 66
MOD. L. REV. 726, 738-39 (2003).
81. Cf Andrew von Hirsch, The Ethics of Public Television Surveillance, in ETHICAL
AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION 59, 61-65 (Andrew von
Hirsch et al. eds., 2000) (discussing how the public perceives public video surveillance).
82. Two months after Peck the Court issued an admissibility decision in another case in
which video surveillance of allegedly public areas also occurred. The applicant and govern-
ment in the case based their arguments in large part on reasonable expectations of privacy, but
the Court declared the Article 8 claim admissible without assessing the case in detail. Martin
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 63608/00, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. CD91, CD102-03 (2003) (Admis-
sibility Decision). The case subsequently settled before the merits could be heard, and the
Court struck the case from its docket.
83. 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (2005).
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occurring conflict between Princess Caroline von Hannover of
Monaco and the paparazzi. Apart from discussing reasonable expecta-
tions, the judgment is notable for how it explains the relationship be-
tween the right to respect for private life and the right to freedom of
expression in Article 10.84 In von Hannover, Princess Caroline tried to
enjoin a series of German tabloid publications that contained, among
other things, photos of her and her then boyfriend at a restaurant; her
canoeing, horseback riding, shopping, and playing tennis; and her at
the Monte Carlo Beach Club tripping over an obstacle. After she at-
tained mixed results in lower German courts, the German Federal
Constitutional Court denied most of her complaint on the ground that
she was a figure par excellence (or public figure for all purposes).
That meant that under German law she was, when outside her home,
fair game for photographers unless she had retired to a secluded place,
out of the public eye, where it was objectively clear to everyone that
she wanted to be alone and where, confident of being alone, she be-
haved differently than she would in public. 85
Princess Caroline complained to the European Court of Human
Rights alleging that the German court decisions failed to respect her
private and family life. The Court began, as it often does, by analyz-
ing whether Article 8 applied at all. It noted among other things that
Article 8 comprises to a certain extent a person's personal identity (in-
cluding name and picture), psychological and physical integrity, and
interaction with others. 86 But the Court also stated that it had in the
past acknowledged the relevance of expectations of privacy:
[I]n certain circumstances, a person has a 'legitimate expectation' of pro-
tection and respect for his or her private life. Accordingly, [the Court]
has held in a case concerning the interception of telephone calls on busi-
84. Article 10(1) provides in part: "Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.
This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and
ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers." Convention, supra
note 2, art. 10(1).
85. von Hannover, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25. This test represents the Constitutional
Court's attempt to reconcile the rights to personality and freedom of expression found in
Germany's Basic Law. The court first determines the role or function of the applicant in so-
ciety-i.e., whether he or she is a public figure. Second, if the applicant is a public figure for
all purposes, the court then focuses on the place or location where the claimant was photo-
graphed or observed. The European Court of Human Rights has labeled the first part of the
German test the "functional" aspect and the second part the "spatial" aspect. Id. 54. For an
analysis of the German court decisions, see Thomas Lundmark & Richard Chlup, Princess
Caroline in Bismarck's Shadow: Photographs of Public Figures in German Law, JURIST
LEGAL INTELLIGENCE, Feb. 15, 2001, at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/world/gercor2.htm.
86. von Hannover, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 50.
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ness premises that the applicant 'would have had a reasonable expectation
ofprivacy for such calls.' [Halford v. United Kingdom].8
The Court then concluded, albeit with no explanation whatsoever,
that "[i]n the present case there is no doubt that the publication by
various German magazines of photos of the applicant in her daily
life.., falls within the scope of her private life" 88 and that "she
should, in the circumstances of the case, have had a 'legitimate expec-
tation' of protection of her private life. ' 89 Notably, the Court did not
apply the data-processing test discussed in P. G. & J.H. and Peck. The
significance of the Court's omission remains to be seen, but one could
argue that the omission strengthens the view that reasonable expecta-
tions could soon become the determinative test and that data process-
ing is but a factor to consider within the scope of that test.90
The Court next discussed whether the press's right to freedom of
expression under Article 10 justified the Government's failure to pro-
vide Princess Caroline with a means in domestic law to stop the publi-
cations. In this respect, the Court held that the "decisive factor in bal-
87. Id. 51 (emphases added).
88. Id. 153.
89. Id. 78; see also id. 69. The judgment has been criticized for its lack of reasoning
on this point. See Michael A. Sanderson, Is von Hannover v. Germany a Step Backward for
the Substantive Analysis of Speech and Privacy Interests, 2004 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 631,
638, 640-43 (2004); Comment, Media Law: Publication by the Media of Photographs of the
Applicant, 2004 EuR. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 593, 595 (2004). In light of its finding on private
life, the Court did not decide whether family life applied. von Hannover, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep.
81.
90. Although not mentioned in von Hannover, the Court probably consulted the decision
of the House of Lords in Campbell v. MGN Ltd, [20041 2 All E.R. 995 (U.K.H.L. 2004),
which was factually similar and involved Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention as incorporated
into domestic U.K. law by the Human Rights Act of 1998. There, supermodel Naomi Camp-
bell sued The Mirror for publishing stories (with photographs) about her addiction to drugs.
The House of Lords had to decide whether the case involved a private matter and, if so, how
to balance that interest against the right of freedom of the press. By a decision of 3 to 2, the
Lordships found for Campbell, although they could not seem to agree on which test to use to
determine whether private life applied. Baroness Hale and Lord Nicholls stated that the
touchstone of private life is whether the person in question has a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Id. at 1031-33, I 134-37 (Hale, L.J.); id. at 1004, 21 (Nicholls, L.J., dissenting).
On the other hand, Lord Hope advocated two separate tests for determining when private life
applies: (1) when a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the matter involved, the
matter is "obviously private"; and (2) when the first test fails, a matter nevertheless is private
if its disclosure or observation would highly offend a reasonable person of ordinary sensibili-
ties. Id. at 1019-21, JR 92-99 (Hope, L.J.). Lord Carswell, in turn, said only that the informa-
tion was obviously private, and he therefore did not consider the "offensiveness" test, id. at
1040, 166 (Carswell, L.J.), and Lord Hoffman resolved the issue in a manner similar to Lord
Carswell, id. at 1011, 1015, i 53-54, 75 (Hoffman, L.J., dissenting). Notably, a more recent
Court of Appeal decision has since adopted the reasonable-expectations test. X v. Y, [2004]
E.W.C.A. Civ. 662, I 55, 67 (Eng. C.A. 2004). See also R. v. Chief Constable, [2004] 4 All
E.R. 193, 216, 1 71 (U.K.H.L. 2004) (Hale, L.J., dissenting).
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ancing the protection of private life against freedom of expression
should lie in the contribution that the published photos and articles
make to a debate of general interest."'" Carrying out its review, the
Court found that the photos at issue failed to contribute to such a de-
bate but instead served solely to satisfy the "curiosity of a particular
readership regarding [Princess Caroline's] private life." 92 The Court
therefore interpreted the right to freedom of expression narrowly so
that in effect it ceded to the right to respect for private life.93 As a re-
sult, the Court held that Germany had violated Article 8.
More was said about the reasonable-expectations test in the con-
curring opinion of Judge Barreto. He agreed (for the most part) with
the outcome of the case but disagreed with the Court's use of a sepa-
rate "debate of general interest" test to account for Article 10. Instead,
Judge Barreto endorsed the view that the Court should use the reason-
able-expectations test more broadly so as to render a separate "debate
of general interest" test unnecessary: "[W]henever a public figure has
a 'legitimate expectation' of being safe from the media his or her right
to private life prevails over the right to freedom of expression or the
right to be informed." 94 In his view, the reasonable-expectations test
already incorporates the public interest component of Article 10 be-
cause it inherently "acknowledge[s] that, in view of their fame, a pub-
lic figure's life outside their home, and particularly in public places, is
inevitably subject to certain constraints. Fame and public interest in-
evitably give rise to a difference in treatment of the private life of an
ordinary person and that of a public figure." 95  Using that precept,
Judge Barreto then parted ways with the majority with regard to the
reasonableness of certain expectations of privacy. He doubted, for ex-
ample, that Princess Caroline could "entertain a reasonable expecta-
tion of not being exposed to public view or to the media" 96 at the
beach club or while shopping.97
91. von Hannover, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 76; see also id. 63.
92. Id. 165.
93. Id. T 64-68, 76-77.
94. Id. 0-12 (Barreto, J., concurring). Judge Barreto's statement of the test implicitly
recognizes partial expectations of privacy in how it highlights the expectation vis-A-vis the
media.
95. Id.; accord Hosking & Hosking v. Runting, [2005] 1 N.Z.L.R. 1, 120 (C.A. 2004)
("Viewed objectively, as it must be, the reasonable expectations of privacy of [those in public
life] will necessarily be lower since it is inevitable the media will subject celebrity figures...
to closer scrutiny and because the public has a natural curiosity and interest not only in the
personal lives and activities of the celebrity but also in their families.").
96. von Hannover, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. T 0-12 (Barreto, J., concurring).
97. Judge Zupan~i6 also filed a concurring opinion in which he endorses the reasonable-
expectations test. Id. [ 0-1i to 0-117 (Zupandid, J., concurring). It is unclear from his
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The von Hannover judgment and its concurrences highlight two
important issues. First, at least some judges disagree on the proper
reach of the reasonable-expectations test. The majority seemed con-
tent to use the test to decide solely whether private life applied and to
use another test (the contributes to a "debate of general interest" test)
to account for Article 10. Judge Barreto (and perhaps Judge Zupan-
i), on the other hand, sought to blend the two analyses into one test
by in effect incorporating the public interest justification of Article 10
into the reasonable-expectations test of Article 8. I believe the major-
ity approach of keeping the tests separate is the better one. Under the
Barreto approach, it will be difficult to ascertain whether a claim has
failed because the matter does not relate to private life or because a
more compelling public-interest need overrode a private-life interest.
The Court should keep the applicability analysis of private life sepa-
rate from the justification analysis normally carried out under Article
8(2).98 Beyond that, I would add only that Judge Barreto's approach
also fails to consider that rights other than private life (such as home
and correspondence) can trigger Article 8 and that some separate test
to account for Article 10 will remain necessary in those other con-
texts.99
The second issue von Hannover underscores is that the determina-
tion of reasonableness (especially when based on notions of common
sense) will likely lead to "differences of opinion" 100 among judges.
Thus, if reasonable expectations is going to be the benchmark for fu-
ture cases, and the Court hopes to maintain consistency and credibility
in its decisions, the Court will have to develop a more structured and
objective framework by which to proceed. In the next part of this arti-
opinion, however, whether he proposes that the Court should (1) merely make the test the
"determinative" method by which to judge private life or (2) use the test to judge private life
and the public interest component of Article 10 (as Judge Barreto suggested). For a commen-
tator adopting the latter reading of Judge Zupan~i 's opinion, see Paul Reid, "Regulating"
Online Data Privacy, 1 SCRIPT-ED 533, 536 (2004), at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrb/script-
ed/issue3/privacy.asp (last visited Apr. 11, 2005).
98. Accord Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [20041 2 All E.R. 995, 1004, 9 21-22 (U.K.H.L.
2004) (Nicholls, L.J., dissenting) ("[I]n deciding what was the ambit of an individual's 'pri-
vate life' in particular circumstances courts need to be on guard against using as a touchstone
a test which brings into account considerations which should more properly be considered at
the later stage of proportionality."). For related reasons, under my proposal, when searching
national legal instruments for a recognized expectation of privacy (see infra Part HI.C), the
Court should ignore those provisions of a member State's laws that incorporate a free speech
or similar Article-10-type defense that might eliminate an otherwise-recognized expectation.
99. Unless, of course, Judge Barreto believes that the Court should use reasonable ex-
pectations to judge all the rights under Article 8. See discussion supra Part I1.B and infra Part
DH.E.
100. von Hannover, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. $ 0-12 (Barreto, J., concurring).
2005]
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cle, I suggest a possible framework that addresses these issues and the
many others flagged previously.
III. DEVELOPING REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS AS THE RULE FOR
DETERMINING WHETHER PRIVATE LIFE APPLIES
The preceding sections have demonstrated that whereas the Con-
vention tribunals initially defined private life in a piecemeal fashion
and without reference to any general framework, some opinions of the
Court have now floated a trial balloon based on a person's reasonable
expectations of privacy. Unfortunately, the test is underdeveloped.
Having been around for only seven years, it is in its relative infancy at
the Court. Making matters worse, during that time the test has been
mentioned in only a handful of cases, much less been actively utilized.
This has led the Court to leave many questions unanswered or an-
swered inadequately. Among them are: (1) whether the reasonable-
expectations test should also apply to personal choice claims; (2) how
to frame an applicant's claim of privacy or personal choice; (3) how to
assess the reasonableness of a purported expectation; (4) whether ac-
tual expectations are relevant; (5) whether the reasonable-expectations
test should also assess the applicability of the other rights in Article 8;
and (6) whether the reasonable-expectations test should incorporate
the public interest justification of Article 10. The remainder of this ar-
ticle addresses the first five of these six issues.101
A. Personal Choice Claims
The Court has yet to apply or even mention the reasonable-
expectations test in a case involving a pure personal choice claim.
Does this indicate the Court would refuse to extend the test to those
sorts of cases? Doubtful. If anything, the Court appears to have
hinted it might soon head in the personal choice direction. In von
Hannover, the Court described the reasonable-expectations test as in-
volving a "'legitimate expectation' of protection and respect for ...
private life" 102-not simply as an expectation of privacy, as it had in
previous cases. Insofar as the distinction was intentional, it suggests
the Court has left open the possibility of extending the test to all pri-
vate-life claims. One might also go so far as to argue that the von
Hannover case itself had a personal choice component: the publica-
101. I already have offered my thoughts on the sixth issue in my discussion of von Han-
nover.
102. von Hannover, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 51 (emphasis added).
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tion of the photographs encroached on Princess Caroline's ability to
develop personal relationships of her own choosing without outside
interference.103 In any event, it may only be a matter of time before
the Court makes this extension more transparent.
For the sake of completeness and consistency it would appear the
Court should, apart from refining the analytical framework of the rea-
sonable-expectations test, apply a similar test to personal choice
cases. I have therefore, in the sections that follow, tried to construct a
reasonable-expectations test that includes the necessary refinement in
both categories of private life. Consider the following proposed
statement as the standard to govern future cases in which the applica-
bility of private life is in question:
A public authority may not, without proper justification,
interfere with or fail to respect matters in which a person has
a reasonable expectation of privacy or personal choice. Be-
fore the Court may hold that an expectation is reasonable,
however, it must find, at a minimum, a simple majority (i.e.
emerging consensus) among the member States, as deter-
mined by legal and societal norms, that recognizes the right of
privacy or personal choice invoked by the applicant.
B. Framing the Applicant's Claim
Given the underdevelopment of the reasonable-expectations test
in the Court's jurisprudence, it is not surprising that the Court has said
little on how to frame an application that attempts to satisfy the expec-
tations standard. Nevertheless, the key to framing the expectation is
simple. The Court and the Parties must include as many salient facts
as possible, rather than presenting the issue in a more abstract way. 1
°4
Too few facts may lead the Court to recognize an expectation as rea-
sonable that it should not have or reject an expectation that it should
have found reasonable. Improper construction of the issues also may
prevent the Court from looking to legal and societal norms that recog-
nize partial expectations of privacy."' Particular attention should
103. See infra note 114.
104. Daniel Solove appears to advocate a similar pragmatic approach to conceptualizing
privacy in his proposal on the subject. See Solove, supra note 33, at 1128 ("A pragmatic ap-
proach to the task of conceptualizing privacy should not... begin by seeking to illuminate an
abstract conception of privacy, but should focus instead on understanding privacy in specific
contextual situations."); see also id. at 1130.
105. Cf. Colin Warbrick, "Federal" Aspects of the European Convention on Human
2005]
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therefore be paid to: (1) the type, nature, and frequency of the intru-
sion; (2) the location of the intrusion; (3) the identity of the intruder;
(4) any exposure attendant to the intrusion; and (5) whether the case
allegedly involves a privacy or personal-choice expectation.
The importance and consequences of factual specificity are best
demonstrated by example. Take, for instance, the common situation
(at least in the United States) in which a regulation states that when a
person brings a lawsuit, the court will assign the case to a particular
judge, and the litigant must present all arguments to that judge only,
barring some showing of bias or impropriety. Now suppose the liti-
gant challenges this law on the ground he believes the decision of
whom to speak to is a decision that ordinarily would be of personal
choice, and that therefore the government, by not permitting him to
present his case to another judge, has interfered with his Article 8
right. 116 It seems like an absurd case. But if the Court frames the ex-
pectation without sufficient facts, e.g., by posing it simply as whether
it would be reasonable to state that it is ordinarily a matter of personal
choice to decide whom to speak to and whom not to, then the Court
would undoubtedly have to find the expectation to be reasonable (as I
assume that legal and societal norms would overwhelmingly point in
this direction). But as more facts are added, e.g., whether it would be
reasonable for a person to expect that he had the personal choice of
deciding which judge to present his arguments to, it becomes less
likely the Court would adjudge the expectation to be reasonable. Of
course, it should be repeated that the analysis I speak of here relates
solely to the applicability of Article 8; the Court can still dismiss an
absurd application on the basis of a government's justification under
Article 8(2) (or the positive-obligations balancing test).
Factual specificity and careful construction of the issues also are
particularly important in privacy cases because sometimes, as I have
adverted to earlier, reasonable expectations can be partial. "There are
degrees and nuances to societal recognition of our expectations of pri-
vacy,"' 17 and the rule should not be that for an expectation of privacy
to be reasonable that expectation must be of absolute privacy. The
Rights, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 698, 716-17 (1989) (noting in a different context that the "Court
can protect the national interest of a State not only by a narrow interpretation of the rights but
also by its characterization of the individual's application").
106. An applicant might also attempt to raise an Article 10 claim.
107. Sanders v. ABC, Inc., 978 P.2d 67, 72 (Cal. 1999); accord Elizabeth Paton-
Simpson, Private Circles and Public Squares: Invasion of Privacy by the Publication of "Pri-
vate Facts," 61 MOD. L. REV. 318, 321-26 (1998); Ernest van den Haag, On Privacy, in
NOMOS XIU: PRIVACY, supra note 32, at 149, 157-58.
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California Supreme Court demonstrated this point in its decision
Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc.,l08 a case involving the tort of
intrusion of privacy (which requires as an essential element that the
plaintiff have a reasonable expectation of privacy). There, the plain-
tiffs were injured when their car overturned in an accident. A medical
rescue helicopter crew arrived at the scene accompanied by a televi-
sion cameraman. Unbeknown to the victims, the cameraman had fit-
ted the rescue nurse with a small microphone that enabled him to re-
cord the victims' conversations with the nurse. The cameraman's
video footage then later appeared, without the plaintiffs' permission,
on a documentary television show called On Scene: Emergency Re-
sponse (not unlike in the Peck case). The plaintiffs sued for intrusion
of privacy, among other claims.' 09
In finding that the plaintiffs could have had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in their conversations with the rescue personnel, the
Court held that "mass media videotaping [and surreptitious recording]
may constitute an intrusion even when the events and communications
recorded were visible and audible to some limited set of observers at
the time they occurred." 0 The California Supreme Court later ex-
plained its holding as follows:
[We have never] stated that an expectation of privacy, in order to be rea-
sonable for purposes of the intrusion tort, must be of absolute or complete
privacy....
... [A] person may reasonably expect privacy against the electronic re-
cording of a communication, even though he or she had no reasonable ex-
pectation as to confidentiality of the communication's contents ...
"While one who imparts private information risks the betrayal of his con-
fidence by the other party, a substantial distinction has been recognized
between the secondhand repetition of the contents of a conversation and
its simultaneous dissemination to an unannounced second auditor, whether
that auditor be a person or a mechanical device.... [S]uch secret monitor-
ing denies the speaker an important aspect of privacy of communication-
the right to control the nature and extent of the firsthand dissemination of
his statements." 1
108. 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
109. Id. at 474-77.
110. Sanders, 978 P.2d at 72 (summarizing its holding in Shulman).
111. Id. at 71-72 (quoting Shulman, 955 P.2d at 492, and discussing several cases from
other U.S. jurisdictions that have taken a similar approach). California's partial-expectations
approach is not accepted in all of the United States, however. See, e.g., Med. Lab. Mgmt.
Consultants v. ABC, Inc., 306 F.3d 806, 815-16 (9th Cir. 2002); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977). Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has essentially rejected the
approach in the Fourth Amendment context. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449-52
(1989); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-43 (1988); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
20051
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Thought of another way, this principle means that a court should focus
not solely on the nature of the information per se but on how that in-
formation was subsequently used or disclosed.'
As I have recounted elsewhere, the European Court of Human
Rights has already implicitly accepted a partial-expectations approach,
particularly in the cases in which the Court focused on facts relating to
how and by whom information was processed. 113 The Court should
continue to ensure that it collects sufficient facts and properly frames
the applicants' expectations in future cases to allow it to recognize
partial expectations of privacy. (Whether and how those expectations
should be judged reasonable is a subject I address in the next section.)
A final word should also be said about the consequences of cor-
rectly framing the expectation as involving either the privacy or per-
sonal choice component of private life. Both the parties and the Court
should be careful in this regard, as placing an issue in a particular
category may affect the outcome of a case." 4 Take, for example,
some of the cases relating to transsexuality. Many of the applicants'
complaints concern public records (e.g., driver's licenses) that contain
their old gender status and that disclose to others during ordinary use
that the person who appears before them as a male must have at one
time been a female (or vice versa). These sorts of cases should be
presented as privacy expectations. But if the case has less to do with
the secrecy of the gender change and more to do with a person's status
as a transsexual per se, it should instead be presented and addressed as
a personal choice expectation; otherwise, the claim will fail.' '
207, 213-15 (1986); Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth
Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1086, 1133-38 (2002) ("The Court's current
conception of privacy is as a form of total secrecy.").
112. Cf. WACKS, supra note 54, at 24 (urging courts and legislatures to define "personal
information" by referring "both to the quality of the information and to the reasonable expec-
tations of the individual concerning its use") (other emphases omitted).
113. See supra Parts II.C-.D.
114. There may of course be cases in which one could frame an expectation under both
categories. For example, most claims relating to informational privacy can also be framed as
personal-choice expectations. Cf. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (de-
scribing "informational privacy" as empowering "the claim of individuals.., to determine for
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to oth-
ers"). And in some cases the publication of private information may "constrain[] a person's
choices as to his or her private behaviour, interfering in a major way with his or her auton-
omy." David Feldman, Secrecy, Dignity, or Autonomy? Views of Privacy as a Civil Liberty,
in 47(2) CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 41, 57 (M.D.A. Freeman & R. Halson eds., 1994). Fur-
thermore, I should add that the consequences of framing the expectation in one category over
the other will be less pronounced when searching for legal norms than when searching for so-
cietal norms.
115. Similar distinctions may be drawn in cases involving homosexuality, as was demon-
strated in Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988), where criminal laws restricted
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C. The Reasonableness of the Expectation
The more difficult question is how to take the expectation as
framed by the parties and the Court and then decide whether that ex-
pectation is reasonable. I expect this area to cause the Court the most
trouble. In my view, the expectation should be judged against what a
free and democratic society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." 6
But this statement is simply a shorthand. Determining what expecta-
tions a free and democratic society is prepared to recognize as reason-
able depends on which countries to include in the definition of a free
and democratic society, the threshold for when an expectation be-
comes reasonable, and the evidence the Court can consider to meet
that threshold. I discuss each of these topics in the sections that fol-
low and conclude that before the Court may hold that an expectation is
reasonable, the Court must find, at a minimum, a simple majority (i.e.,
emerging consensus) among the member States, as determined by le-
gal and societal norms, that recognizes the right of privacy or personal
choice invoked by the applicant. Searching for a trend among State
practices should be familiar to the Court given its use of a similar ex-
ercise in the margin-of-appreciation context. 1 7
the behavior of an openly gay applicant.
[T]he interference with privacy involved [there] could not consist of activities of
the state in disclosing to public view facts which the applicants wished to keep se-
cret. Rather, the Court [held] that respect for private life includes respect for the
applicant's sexual life by which, of course, the Court must mean a sexual life of
the applicant's own choosing. Thus, 'private' must be read to refer not to ques-
tions of disclosure or nondisclosure but the right to choose certain intimate aspects
of one's life, free of government regulation.
MARK W. JANIS ET AL., EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 278 (2d ed.
2000).
116. Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating
that in determining whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy for purposes of a
search or seizure conducted by law enforcement authorities, the court must inquire whether
the individual's expectation of privacy is "one that society is prepared to recognize as 'rea-
sonable"').
117. See supra Part I.A. The Court also has on occasion endorsed a comparative method
to interpret terms in the Convention. See, e.g., Engel v. Netherlands, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
82 (1976); Ezeh & Connors v. United Kingdom, 39 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 82 (2004). Judge
Matscher offered his own explanation of this approach in Kdnig v. Germany, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1978). There, he stated:
[O]ne must look for the "common denominator" behind the provisions in question,
since it is legitimate to suppose-in the absence of any legal definition in the Con-
vention itself-that such is the meaning which the Contracting States wished these
provisions to have. This "common denominator" can be found through a compara-
tive analysis of the domestic law of the Contracting States.
Id. I A (Matscher, J.) (but not defining what amounts to a common denominator). The Court
also recently referred to the practices of member States when it struck a provision of the Con-
vention that expressly permits the death penalty. See Convention, supra note 2, art. 2(1). In
Ocalan v. Turkey, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 10 (2003), the Court held (over a dissent) that it could
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1. The Countries to Consult
The first issue the Court must consider is which countries to in-
clude in the definition of a "free and democratic society." In other
words, which countries should the Court consult in its search for an
emerging consensus? Foremost, it would seem the Court should in-
clude all the member States of the Convention. As contracting parties
and the nations who will be bound by any interpretations of the Con-
vention, the member States should certainly have a say in what the
Convention means. Moreover, by virtue of their membership in the
Convention and the Council of Europe, each of the member States
also accepts, at least in theory, "the principles of the rule of law and of
the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights
and fundamental freedoms."' 8 We should therefore presume that
each of these countries has the proper quality to take their place
among free and democratic societies.
There are, of course, free and democratic societies other than
those of the Council of Europe, and the question thus arises whether
the Court should include an analysis of those other countries as well.
Nothing in the Convention jurisprudence suggests this would be inap-
propriate. To the contrary, "some [Court] interpretations of Conven-
tion guarantees [already] refer to the law and practice of States
which... [are] not Parties to the European Convention on Human
Rights." 19 Consistent with this practice, the Court could in certain
circumstances consult the views of non-member countries-with two
important limitations. First, the Court should only consult countries
that share with Europe "a common heritage of political traditions, ide-
read the permission out of the Convention because 43 of the 44 contracting States had abol-
ished (and the 44th State had suspended) the death penalty for crimes committed during peace
time. The Court ruled as it did despite the fact the member States had opted to use the proto-
col system to amend Article 2(l)--namely Protocol Nos. 6 and 13, which call for abolition of
the death penalty under peace and war time, respectively-and that not all contracting States
had ratified these protocols. Id. IN 189-98. The case is currently being reheard by a Grand
Chamber of the Court. See Pending Cases Before a Grand Chamber, http://www.echr.coe.-
int/BilingualDocuments/PendCase.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2005).
By way of comparison, the U.S. Supreme Court has used a similar consensus-based
approach to interpret the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. That Amendment,
when read in conjunction with the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that neither the federal
government nor the governments of the states may inflict "cruel and unusual punishments."
U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII. In interpreting this phrase, the Supreme Court asks whether there
exists a "national consensus" against the practice at issue. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
314, 316-17 (2002).
118. Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, art. 3, 87 U.N.T.S. 103, C.E.T.S. 1.
119. Kersten Rogge, Fact-Finding, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 677, 682 (R. St. J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993).
30
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 35, No. 2 [2005], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol35/iss2/2
DEFINING PRIVATE LIFE UNDER THE ECHR
als, freedom and the rule of law."' 120 I have in mind countries such as
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States, but there are
others as well.12' Second, because of the risk of selective piling-on of
views from non-member States to influence a case, the Court should
consult non-member countries only when truly necessary (i.e., when
the practices of the contracting States are teetering on a balance of op-
posing views) and, in such a case, be as complete and inclusive as
possible in selecting and including those non-member countries.
2. The Evidence to Consider
Having decided which countries to consult, the next logical issue
is how to consult them. In searching for a sufficient consensus, it
would seem the Court should determine the position of each State in-
dividually, insofar as possible, and then compare the positions of the
States to one another. This appears more principled than a gestalt-like
approach. In performing this task, the Court should consider two
principal factors: 22
1. Legal instruments, including national constitutions, legisla-
tion, regulations, and case law; 123 regional and international
treaties to which the State is a signatory; the case law of the
Convention tribunals; and the case law of the European Court
of Justice, insofar as applicable to the State in question; and
2. Societal norms and customs, 124 as demonstrated by public
opinion surveys, 125 social science, legal-enforcement histories,
and pending legal reforms.
12 6
120. Convention, supra note 2, pmbl.
121. Determining which non-member countries to include is beyond the scope of this ar-
ticle. One commentator has offered selection criteria in the context of which countries the
United States should look to in its use of comparative analysis. Rex D. Glensy, Which Coun-
tries Count?: Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection of Foreign Persuasive Authority, 45 VA. J.
INT'L L. (forthcoming May 2005); see also ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
PRIVATE SPHERE 147-48 (1993) (listing some of the hallmarks of a democratic society).
122. Cf. Laurence R. Helfer, Consensus, Coherence and The European Convention on
Human Rights, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 133, 139 (1993) (observing the importance of similar
factors in the margin-of-appreciation context) [hereinafter Consensus, Coherence and the
ECHR]; Laurence R. Helfer, Finding a Consensus on Equality: The Homosexual Age of Con-
sent and the European Convention on Human Rights, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1044, 1056-57
(1990) (same).
123. Daniel Solove provides a good example of how this part of the investigation might
come out (under U.S. law) in a case where a doctor wrongly discloses medical information
about a patient. See Solove, supra note 111, at 1155-56.
124. For an instructive proposal on how courts should obtain information from the social
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This sort of comparative, empirical approach (often absent in the
cases) 127 is necessary given that there must be "some methodology or
evidence upon which the [Court] can base the stated perception of the
common will. The evolving standards in the Convention should be in-
formed by empirical evidence [rather than] simply be plucked from
the sky by the judge."'' 28
In some cases, a conflict may exist within a State between legal
instruments and societal norms, thereby making it difficult for the
Court to determine the true position of a member State. Whether to
favor the legal instrument over the societal norm should depend on the
nature and source of the law. A legal instrument may prima facie (1)
sciences and evaluate that information to interpret laws, see John Monahan & Laurens
Walker, Judicial Use of Social Science Research, 15 LAW & HuM. BEHAv. 571, 573-76, 582-
83 (1991); John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 495-516 (1986).
125. Cf Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Pri-
vacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings
Recognized and Permitted by Society," 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 759-74 (1993) (surveying 217 indi-
viduals to gauge the intrusiveness of police-investigative techniques); Christopher Slobogin,
Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 Miss.
L.J. 213, 271-85 (2002) (surveying 190 individuals to determine the intrusiveness of closed
circuit television surveillance).
126. The U.S. Supreme Court has considered similar factors in assessing whether a na-
tional consensus exists in Eighth Amendment cases. See supra note 117. The Supreme Court
favors objective indicia and therefore first looks to (1) the legislative enactments of the 50
states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government (as those enactments are inter-
preted by their respective judiciaries); and (2) the practices of prosecutors and sentencing ju-
ries within those jurisdictions. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-77 (1989); Thomp-
son v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821-22 (1988). The Supreme Court also has on occasion
considered other criteria such as public opinion polls; the views of interest groups; the legisla-
tion and case law of other countries; and the instruments of international organizations. E.g.,
Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1194-1200 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316
n.21 (2002); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334-35 (1989); Stanford, 492 U.S. at 389-90(Brennan, J., dissenting); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830-31 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
127. Rudolf Bernhardt, The Convention and Domestic Law, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM
FOR THE PROTECTION OF HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 119, at 25, 35 ("A comparative approach
seems to be an absolute necessity in order to find common European principles in the legal
orders of these States. [T] Under these circumstances, it may be astonishing that extensive
comparative law analyses cannot be found in the judgments of the Court or the reports of the
Commission.").
128. Paul Mahoney, Judicial Activism and Judicial Self-Restraint in the European Court
of Human Rights: Two Sides of the Same Coin, 11 HuM. RTS. L.J. 57, 73-74 (1990); accord
ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 16, at 197 ("Vague references to 'emerging national standards',
which are not empirically verifiable, would undermine [the Strasbourg organs'] credibility
and sow the seed of suspicion that they are engaged in an unfounded judicial activism."). The
U.S. Supreme Court has raised similar concerns in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. See
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) ("Eighth Amendment judgments should not be,
or appear to be, merely the subjective views of individual Justices; judgment should be in-
formed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent.").
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approve of an expectation by guaranteeing that a person such as the
applicant has a right of privacy or personal choice in the matter at is-
sue, or (2) reject an expectation by stating or reflecting that the matter
is not one in which the applicant can have such an expectation. (Of
course, given the factual specificity required to frame expectations, it
becomes possible that no law will speak directly on the issue either
way.) Under the first circumstance, it would seem the law should ef-
fectively render the expectation reasonable as a matter of law within
that State, regardless of other public or societal evidence to the con-
trary. The public is entitled to rely on laws that benefit them until
those laws are changed. Moreover, to hold otherwise would appear
inconsistent with Article 53 of the Convention.1 29  I would argue,
however, that the second scenario creates at most a presumption that
the expectation is unreasonable in that State, subject to rebuttal by
contrary societal norms evidence. This follows because often within
the national system of a country it takes a long time (sometimes ri-
diculously long) for a State's legislation to reflect public, societal con-
sensus, and often the under protection of privacy in legislation results
not from the will of the people but from special interest groups that
have greater power to influence the legislature.
130
I recognize that the comparative task described here will be diffi-
cult and time consuming. Indeed, commentators have lamented in the
margin-of-appreciation context that the Court lacks the resources to
undertake these types of wide-ranging investigations on its own. 131
Fortunately, it is doubtful these sorts of investigations will have to oc-
cur in every case. Many applications will invoke expectations already
recognized by the Court as involving private life or expectations that
are obviously reasonable. Moreover, the Court will often be able to
dispose of a case on an alternative ground, such as by finding that an-
other right under Article 8 applies or by assuming arguendo that pri-
vate life applies and then ruling that the State's actions are neverthe-
less justified. But in cases in which the existence or extent of a
consensus on private life or personal choice will be hotly contested,
and the issue cannot be avoided, the Court should seek assistance by
making greater use of its rules permitting member-State interven-
129. Convention, supra note 2, art. 53 ("Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as
limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be
ensured under the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which
it is a Party.").
130. Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN
DiNGo L. Rev. 843, 859-60 (2002).
131. See Mahoney, supra note 128, at 76; HARRIS ET AL., supra note 4, at 11, 294.
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tion, 32 party-requested amici curiae,'33 Court-appointed experts, 34 and
legal aid for applicants. 3 5  It also bears stressing that much of the
work to be undertaken here should not markedly increase the Court's
workload beyond what already is often required (although not always
performed) when determining the margin of appreciation to afford a
State. Though not serving the same purposes, the Court can use the
results of the consensus investigation for defining private life as part
of its governmental-justification inquiry, and vice versa. 136
3. The Proper Threshold
Defining the threshold for a sufficient common ground is a more
difficult issue. After all, it is inevitable that in many cases the evi-
dence will demonstrate diversity among the practices of member
States. Should the Court require a true consensus-i.e., all States
must agree that an expectation is reasonable-before the Court can
conclude that private life applies? Or is only an emerging consensus(i.e., simple majority) required? For that matter, is only a handful of
States enough?' 37 The Court already has encountered this problem
with the margin-of-appreciation doctrine, and the cases and scholar-
ship on this related subject are instructive. Those sources demonstrate
that although the Court has not adopted a precise arithmetical thresh-
132. Convention, supra note 2, art. 36; EUR. CT. H.R. RuLE 44.
133. EuR. CT. H.R. RULE 44.
134. Euip. CT. H.R. RuLE Al.
135. EuR. CT. H.R. RuLE 91. For a criticism of the Court's current legal-aid practices,
see Andrew S. Butler, Legal Aid Before Human Rights Treaty Monitoring Bodies, 49 INT'L &
Comp. L.Q. 360 (2000).
136. It remains important to keep in mind that the goals and therefore consequences of
the consensus inquiries differ in each context. With respect to the margin of appreciation, a
consensus or lack thereof is just one of many non-dispositive factors the Court will consider
as part of its analysis of how much discretion to give the government. See supra Part I.A. On
the other hand, the purpose of the consensus investigation under the reasonable-expectations
test (at least as proposed here) is to determine the existence of a prima facie right and the out-
come is dispositive.
137. I recognize that the term "consensus" is ambiguous which is why I have attempted
to clarify the term in the present context. For conflicting definitions of the term, see BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 323-24 (8th ed. 2004) ("A general agreement; collective opinion," but then
referring the reader to the entry for "general consent" which states: "[a]doption without objec-
tion, regardless of whether every voter affirmatively approves."); THE COMPACT OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 318 (2d ed. 1991) ("2. a. Agreement in opinion; the collective unani-
mous opinion of a number of persons."); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
482 (1986) ("2 a : general agreement : UNANIMITY, ACCORD... b : collective opinion : thejudgment arrived at by most of those concerned."); HENRY W. FOWLER, A DICTIONARY OF
MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 91 (1927) ("[C]onsensus means unanimity, or unanimous body, of
opinion or testimony.").
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old, 138 the Convention tribunals have, beginning with the judgment in
Tyrer v. United Kingdom, appeared to embrace a "great majority"
standard 39 (and on occasion a simple majority standard) 4 ° as the basis
for finding a sufficient common ground among the States to decrease
the level of appreciation. 4 ' This is not surprising, given that it would
seem incongruous to hold that the shared position of only a handful of
States is sufficient to suggest that another State's deviation is unrea-
sonable. But should a similar super-majority threshold be adopted in
the reasonable-expectations context? In the next several paragraphs, I
canvass the arguments for and against the various possible thresholds
and conclude that on balance a simple-majority standard is the most
workable and compatible with the Convention.
In the context of reasonable expectations, it can first be said that
there should be at least an emerging consensus (i.e., simple majority)
among the pertinent States before the Court may recognize an expec-
tation as reasonable. As Laurence Helfer has stated in another con-
text:
While it is impossible to specify for every situation a precise formula
for the number of states that must have [taken a certain position], at a
minimum, at least half of the Contracting States should have adopted some
form of the rights-enhancing measure in question. This majority rule
serves as a minimum baseline against which the tribunals can judge the
emergence of genuinely regional norms. 142
138. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 4, at 295-96; see also Ost, supra note 26, at 305 ("When
the Court cites the situation in the 'majority' of the Member States, it is difficult to decide
whether the Court is referring to the statistical majority or an ideal majority of those States
with a high level of protection of individual rights.").
139. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 38 (1978); see also L. & V. v.
Austria, 2003-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 29, 919 47, 50; Sutherland v. United Kingdom, App. No.
25186/94, 9 59 (1997) (Commission Report), http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm
(last visited Apr. 11, 2005); Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 91 46 (1988); Dudg-
eon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. CL H.R. (ser. A) 160 (1981); Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 41 (1979); Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 57
(1976). Given the paucity of explanation that often surrounds the Court's assessments of con-
sensus, it is impossible to discern whether the term "great majority" should be read to mean a
three-fifths, two-thirds, or three-fourths majority (or none of the above). I believe, however,
that it is safe to assume it must mean more than a simple majority but less than unanimity.
140. Albert & Le Compte v. Belgium, 58 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 91 22 (1983); see also
Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 5.6.3 (1990) (Martens, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court's use of the "great majority" standard in the margin-of-appreciation con-
text).
141. I offer no opinion here as to which threshold (if any) is correct in the margin-of-
appreciation context.
142. Helfer, Consensus, Coherence and the ECHR, supra note 122, at 159 (discussing the
Court's consensus methodology in the margin-of-appreciation context). Incidentally, Heifer
states "at least half," but he also refers to this as a "majority rule." Therefore, he probably
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I am inclined to agree. There appears to be no justification for permit-
ting a minority of States to change the status quo-even in the noble
case where the minority's legal and societal norms recognize the ex-
pectation invoked by an applicant. Indeed, the few scholars who have
endorsed the use of minority rules have done so only with respect to
procedural or preliminary matters. 143 Anything less than a simple ma-
jority on substantive issues would be undemocratic, and I imagine the
member States would not tolerate it. 44
I also see no reason for requiring the threshold to be at the other
end of the spectrum, i.e., to require unanimity among the member
States. Such a rule would give each member State too much power to
influence the decisions of the Court; the position of a single State
could scuttle an applicant's private-life claim. Unanimity also would
be unworkable because there will always be a State that has rejected
the applicant's purported expectation. Perhaps most obvious here is
the respondent State. Applicants file claims in the European Court of
Human Rights because the respondent State has already rejected those
claims in national proceedings. This is a strong (although not always
conclusive) indication that the respondent State can be counted among
those that would refuse to recognize the applicant's expectation of
privacy or personal choice. 145 Moreover, even when this sort of inher-
ent rejection is not present, there is still-given the number of States
involved (today 45, soon to be 46) and the diverse cultures of those
States-bound to be at least one opponent to an expectation. Perhaps
most importantly, requiring a true consensus would also contravene
the object and purpose of the Convention. The Court is obligated to
promote and not just maintain human rights. 146 Requiring unanimity
of opinion would make achieving this goal impossible.
Valid arguments exist for requiring unanimity in other contexts,
but even the strongest of those arguments is not persuasive here.
Scholars often acknowledge that in international affairs States should
meant to say half plus one.
143. E.g., Adrian Vermeule, Submajority Rules: Forcing Accountability Upon Majorities,
13 J. POL1T. PHIL. 74, 74 n.3 (2005).
144. Cf. HENRY B. MAYO, AN INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 187 (1960)
("What is the alternative to the majority principle, to trusting the majority of the representa-
tives and using our influence upon them? The simple alternative, for some kind of minority
rule, is not usually put forward today plainly and unashamedly."); id. at 179; HUGO GROTIUS,
DE JURE BELLI AC PACis LIBRI TREs (1625), reprinted in 2 THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW No. 3, bk. 11, 167, 249 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., James B. Scott, ed., 1925) ("[1]t is
manifestly unfair that the majority should be ruled by the minority.").
145. I say strong, but not conclusive, because the respondent State's legal norms may be
out of step with its societal norms.
146. Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct H.R. (ser. A) 119 (1991).
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not be bound by any decision of a collective group unless that decision
was unanimous. Proponents of this position argue that "the nature of
the international community, resting as it does upon the independence
or sovereignty of its component parts, makes acceptance of any other
rule impossible."' 47 This principle is embodied in the protocol system
of the Convention on Human Rights by virtue of customary interna-
tional law.'48 Contracting States must ratify any amendment or proto-
col in order to be bound by it.'4 9 By analogy, one could argue that in-
sofar as the Court is amending the term "private life" to recognize a
new expectation of privacy or personal choice, the Court must do so in
a manner no less stringent than that required to add a protocol. To
permit otherwise would violate the sovereignty and independence of
each of the member States.
Although facially appealing, the contracting States have effec-
tively waived this argument by agreeing to be bound by the decisions
of the Court. 150 As Cromwell Riches prophetically explained in 1940:
Sovereign states may unite in the establishment of permanent international
organs possessing authority to regulate matters of common concern and
they may consent, either expressly or tacitly, to accept as binding deci-
sions reached in these organs by some form of majority vote, without in
any sense compromising their own independence or sovereignty.
15 1
The Court has always ruled on its decisions internally by majority
rule, and this is a practice the member States are aware of and ex-
pect.152 If the contracting States have agreed that a simple majority of
the judges can decide what private life means by whatever manner
147. CROMWELL A. RICHES, MAJORITY RuLE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 8 (1940)
(citing various sources).
148. Cf. Vienna Convention, supra note 17, art. 40(4) ("The amending agreement does
not bind any State already a party to the treaty which does not become a party to the amend-
ing agreement.").
149. E.g., Protocol No. 14 to the Convention, May 13, 2004, art. 19, C.E.T.S. 194; Proto-
col No. 13 to the Convention, May 3, 2002, art. 7(2), C.E.T.S. 187.
150. See Convention, supra note 2, art. 46.
151. RICHES, supra note 147, at 291; see also OVEY & WHITE, supra note 18, at 34-35
("[A]ny general presumption that treaty obligations should be interpreted restrictively since
they derogate from sovereignty of States is not applicable to the Convention."); Rudolf Bern-
hardt, Commentary: The European System, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 299, 300 (1987) ("For a con-
siderable time, European states felt that state sovereignty and... supra-national supervision
were incompatible .... These feelings have, to a large extent, now disappeared, resulting in
the acceptance of the European system."); Reed H. Bement, The European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 24 U. Prrr. L. REv. 563, 585 (1963)
("The ... members have willingly guaranteed a number of individual rights and freedoms
and, more importantly, have granted to a multinational body the power to investigate and to
supervise the extent to which this responsibility is being met.").
152. See EuR. CT. H.R. RULES 23, 88.
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they see fit-sometimes by means of their own subjective views-
there should be no reason to require something more (especially not a
rule of unanimity) from an objective and empirical approach.
Given that neither minority nor unanimity rules are suitable, we
are left with deciding whether to favor a super-majority standard over
a simple majority. Several justifications are often advanced for choos-
ing super-majority rules.153 Chief among them is that the standard bet-
ter protects minority factions from what has been called the "tyranny
of the majority."' 54  Majority factions may regularly suppress the
views and positions of the minority 5 and may even, because of their
position, make structural or institutional changes to help keep them-
selves in power. 5 6  A super-majority rule helps prevent abuses by
weighing the votes of those in the minority more heavily than those in
the majority. For example, if the threshold required to change the
status quo is a three-fifths majority, then the majority must muster 1.5
"yes" votes for every single "no" vote just to break even. 15 7 Scholars
rarely question the ability of super-majority rules to better protect mi-
nority interests from abuses, and I won't do so here.'58 Rather, I doubt
whether, in our context, countries in the minority position need protec-
tion.
At the outset, we can dismiss one of the principal reasons for pro-
tecting minority factions-to prevent the majority from making struc-
tural changes to help keep itself in power. Given the nature of what
the Court is judging here, the existence of a prima facie right to pri-
153. These justifications are most often made in the contexts of elections and legislative
and constitutional decision-making-not judicial decision-making. Nevertheless, given the
nature of my proposal in Part III, those justifications cannot simply be dismissed out of hand.
154. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 330, 332-34 (Henry Reeve
trans., 1898) (1835); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprinted in 43 GREAT BOOKS
OF THE WESTERN WORLD 267, 269 (Robert M. Hutchins ed., 1952).
155. LANI GuiNIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 3, 102-03, 116-17 (1994); Tony Honor6, The Human Commu-
nity and The Principle of Majority Rule, 8 SYD. L. REV. 599, 600, 610 (1979); Note, Superma-
jority Voting Requirements: Possible Constitutional Objections, 55 IOwA L. REV. 674, 676
(1970) [hereinafter Supermajority]; JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 76-77 (1966) (1840).
156. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitu-
tion, 80 TEX. L. REV. 703, 786-87 (2002); Benjamin Lieber & Patrick Brown, On Supermajor-
ities and the Constitution, 83 GEO. L.J. 2347, 2356 (1995); Supermajority, supra note 155, at
677.
157. See Thomas A. Frericks, Super-Majorities and Equal Protection, 31 OHIO ST. L.J.
333, 339 (1970).
158. But see Anthony J. McGann, The Tyranny of the Supermajority: How Majority Rule
Protects Minorities, 16 J. THEORETICAL POLrr. 53 (2004) (arguing that the ability of super-
majority rules to protect the minority is illusory and that simple-majority rules better serve the
needs of minorities).
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vate life, this concern simply does not apply. The second issue, op-
pression of minority views, also should cause little concern. First, no
suppression will occur when the minority comprises countries that
recognize the applicant's expectation of privacy or personal choice.
In those cases, the Court will have to hold (because of the majority's
position) that the applicant's expectation was unreasonable and that
private life does not apply. But those sorts of rulings do nothing more
than maintain the status quo. Countries in the minority faction will
not be required to change their laws to reduce privacy rights; rather,
they will remain free to protect those Article 8 rights beyond what the
Court has recognized in its Convention case law. 159
But what about countries who are in the minority faction on ac-
count of refusing to recognize an expectation? In those sorts of cases,
the Court will have to expand private life (on account of the majority)
to encompass the applicant's expectation and in effect force the mem-
ber States in the minority to do so as well. Suppression of this type
also should not cause concern, however, because it does not rise to the
level of oppression that worries commentators in other contexts. Pro-
ponents of super-majority rules necessarily assume that the makeup of
a majority will persist for some time-e.g., during the two years be-
tween federal elections in the United States-and that over time the
majority will, through multiple decisions, be able to dominate a cer-
tain minority faction. This sort of abuse is less likely to occur in our
context. The countries that makeup the majorities and minorities will
shift as the private-life issue differs in each case. Thus, a State that is
in the minority faction on issue X may well be in the majority faction
on issue Y, and so forth. That having been said, I recognize that a few
member States may be much less protective of personal liberties as a
general matter, and that they will fall in the minority more often than
in the majority. Those States will thus be forced more often than oth-
ers to expand privacy rights beyond their own national desires. I am
hopeful, however, that those countries are so few in number that they
would constitute what I call a super minority. That is to say, they will
always be on the losing side, always in the minority, regardless of
whether the threshold is a simple majority or super majority. There-
fore, they should not form the sole reason for choosing a super-
majority rule.
Another reason advanced for favoring super-majority rules is to
increase the stability of decisions.1 60  By virtue of the fact super-
159. See also Convention, supra note 2, art. 53.
160. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 156, at 787; Frericks, supra note 157, at 339; see
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majority decisions must be made with more than a bare majority, more
parties will have agreed to the decision, and therefore the decision will
be less likely to be reversed or repealed in the future. I do not ques-
tion the logic of this reason for choosing super-majority rules. 161
Rather, once again, the premise does not apply here. The decisions of
the Court will remain stable even if interpretation occurs through the
use of a simple-majority rule. In practice, the Court's decisions on
private life operate as a one-way ratchet. The Court expands the
meaning of private life over time but does not contract it. 162  This
ratchet should continue to function under the reasonable-expectations
test. Member States that have recognized an expectation of privacy or
personal choice are unlikely, after the Court confirms that the expecta-
tion is a component of private life, to shift their legal and societal
practices to eliminate that expectation in their respective jurisdic-
tions. 1 63 Apart from these observations, the object and purpose of the
Convention also appear to require the Court to adopt this ratchet as an
express policy. The job of the Court is to promote and maintain the
ideals and values of a democratic society;' 64 nowhere does the Con-
vention say that the Court may reduce them. By logical extension,
this principle means that the Court should never eliminate from the
meaning of private life an expectation of privacy or personal choice
that it has previously recognized. 1
65
Various policy reasons also militate toward adopting a simple-
majority threshold over a super majority. For one, a less rigorous
standard makes it easier for the Court to (again) fulfill the object and
purpose of the Convention and "further reali[ze]" human rights, as is
also Andrew Caplin & Barry Nalebuff, On 64%-Majority Rule, 56 ECONOMETRICA 787, 789-
90 (1988) (suggesting through economic analysis that super-majority rules lead to more stable
decisions than simple-majority rules).
161. Other scholars have, however. E.g., Frericks, supra note 157, at 339-40.
162. I am not aware of a single instance since the inception of the Convention in 1953 in
which the Court has overruled a prior final judgment to eliminate a prima facie privacy right
that it had recognized previously.
163. Cf Warbrick, supra note 105, at 716 ("[The States cannot lightly change their legis-
lation to retreat from a previous judgment of the Court because the new laws would be con-
trary to the Convention."). The factor most likely to cause a material shift would be the addi-
tion of a large number of States to the membership of the Convention.
164. See supra Part I.B.
165. Again, I should stress here that I am speaking only of the applicability of private life
under Article 8. If there is indeed a major shift in consensus among the member States in a
way that restricts individual rights (say for example during times of war), the offending State
will likely have a valid justification for restricting or infringing the applicant's private life.
See also Convention, supra note 2, art. 15 (permitting States to derogate from certain of their
obligations under the Convention in "time of war or other public emergency threatening the
life of the nation").
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required in the preamble of the Statute of the Council of Europe.166
The Court should not have to wait for what may amount to decades af-
ter a simple majority emerges for a super majority to arrive before it
can act. Further, a simple-majority rule ensures each member State's
position is weighed the same as the others, regardless of whether they
are in the majority or the minority. 16' 7  A super-majority threshold
would weigh "reject" votes more heavily than "accept" votes, thereby
contravening the spirit of the Convention's own anti-discrimination
provisions. 68  Lastly, choosing a simple-majority threshold relieves
the Court of having to make the more difficult choice of selecting
among the various possible super-majority rules-e.g., three-fifths,
two-thirds, three-fourths, or four-fifths. I can discern no principled
reason for choosing one of these thresholds over the other,169 and pru-
166. Statute of the Council of Europe, supra note 118, pmbl.
167. See RICHARD J. ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS: THE INITIATIVE PROCESS IN
AMERICA 122 (2002) ("[M]ajority rule is also a principle with a strong ethical basis in an
egalitarian society. If we are all political equals, then each of our opinions should count
equally. Majority rule is thus the political expression of a liberal commitment to treat each
individual equitably."). Tony Honord also has noted:
[I]f... members are thought of as equal the simplest method and the one which is
least likely to cause dissension is to treat them as equal in relation to the matters to
be decided. Hence they should each have an equal voice in the decision. But this
means that the view of the majority will prevail, since if the weight to be attached
to the opinion of each is the same, the opinion of more than half must have greater
weight than the opinion of less than half.
Honor6, supra note 155, at 602.
168. See Convention, supra note 2, art. 14; Protocol No. 12 to the Convention, Nov. 4,
2000, art. 1, C.E.T.S. 177.
169. By way of comparison, the U.S. Supreme Court has encountered this problem in its
death-penalty jurisprudence. There, the Supreme Court has often, in its analysis of legislative
enactments, seemed to create an implicit threshold that resembles a three-fifths-majority stan-
dard. But the tacit 60% rule seems a bit odd and unprincipled in light of the fact the U.S.
Constitution explicitly states it can only be amended by a three-fourths (75%) majority. U.S.
CONST. AMEND. V. For example, in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), the Supreme
Court rejected an Eighth Amendment challenge to the execution of the mentally retarded
where 17 jurisdictions prohibited this sort of capital punishment, id. at 334, thereby creating
only a 33% rejection of the practice in the United States. But the Supreme Court then re-
versed itself and found an Eighth Amendment violation in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002), when it found that in the intervening years 31 jurisdictions had rejected the practice of
executing the mentally retarded (for a 60% rejection rate). Id. at 314-15. The three-fifths
threshold also appeared in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), where the Supreme
Court struck down laws permitting the execution of defendants who were 15 years old when
they committed their crimes. Thirty-two jurisdictions prohibited the practice, id. at 826-29,
leading to a 62% rejection rate. Also instructive are the Court's decisions on the practice of
executing defendants who were 16 or 17 years old at the time of the offense. In Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), the Court found that the practice did not violate the Eighth
Amendment where only 29 states and the District of Columbia rejected the practice with re-
spect to 16-year-olds (a 58% rejection rate) and only 27 jurisdictions rejected the practice
with respect to 16- and 17-year-olds (a 52% rejection rate). Id. at 370-73. (My calculation
includes those jurisdictions that rejected the death penalty outright, contrary to the position
taken by the majority in Stanford.) Yet in Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005), the
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dence thus suggests it is best to avoid the issue altogether by requiring
only a simple majority before the Court may find an expectation to be
reasonable.
Granted, these are but a handful of issues relating to determining
the appropriate threshold. I imagine others exist as well. For exam-
ple, three issues that immediately come to mind are whether the dura-
tion of the emerging consensus should matter,170 whether the Court
should require an absolute majority, 17 1 and whether the populations of
the member States should be taken into account.1 72 Each of these top-
ics could merit their own treatment, and they are therefore beyond the
scope of this article. Suffice it to say, however, that the Court could
probably avoid these issues for a substantial length of time given that
their resolution would not be required unless the case was exception-
ally close and alternative grounds were not otherwise available.
Court reversed course and ruled that capital punishment of minors violated the Eighth
Amendment. The change in objective criteria was slight, with 30 states, the District of Co-
lumbia, and the federal government rejecting the execution of anyone under 18 years old (a
62% rejection rate). Id. at 1190-94. Earlier cases do not always exhibit this 60% threshold,
however. E.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 463-64 (1984) (rejecting an Eighth
Amendment challenge to Florida's practice of allowing a judge to impose the death penalty in
the face of a recommendation of life from the jury, even though 81% of jurisdictions with the
death penalty rejected such a practice).
170. Cf. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 344 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing in the Eighth Amendment
context that the Court should consider the age of the laws which make up a purported national
consensus; "[it] is 'myopic to base sweeping constitutional principles upon the narrow experi-
ence of [a few] years"') (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 614 (1977) (Burger, J., dis-
senting)).
171. The absolute-majority issue would arise in cases in which the Court cannot, despite
its best efforts, discern a member State's position on a particular expectation. What should be
done with States that have in effect abstained? Under an absolute-majority rule, the Court
would have to find a simple majority among all the member States; i.e., a 23-vote majority is
always required. For example, if 30 of the 45 member States have a discemable position but
15 do not, then, of those 30 States, 77% must favor the expectation in order for the Court to
recognize it. In cases where the absolute-majority rule does not apply, the Court would only
need to find a simple majority among those States that have a discernable position. This issue
should not arise often as I am hopeful the Court will be able to discern the position of every
member State (often with assistance of the States themselves). Though I leave this subject for
another day, an interesting economic analysis of the subject may be found in Keith L. Dough-
erty & Julian Edward, Simple v. Absolute Majority Rule, Jan. 11, 2005, at 2-3, 17-19 (suggest-
ing that simple-majority rules more frequently outperform absolute-majority rules), at http://-
www.arches.uga.edu/-dougherk/simple-absoluteMSS.pdf.
172. Compare, for example, the voting procedures under the proposed European Union
Constitution. See EU Heads Hail Constitution Deal, BBC NEWS, June 19, 2004 ("Under the
new voting rules, measures must have the backing of at least 15 EU states, representing at
least 65% of the total population, in order to pass."), http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/-
europe/3821305.stm; Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, arts. 1-25,
1-44, 47 O.J. C-3 10.
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D. The Relevance of the Applicant's Actual Expectations
Earlier in this article I flagged and then tabled the question of
whether an applicant's actual or subjective expectations of privacy or
personal choice should be at all relevant in analyzing whether private
life applies.'73 The European Court of Human Rights could take one
of three approaches to this issue: actual expectations are (1) required,
(2) relevant to a certain extent, or (3) irrelevant. The United States
has, by way of comparison, taken the first approach (for the most part)
and required litigants who seek to invoke their rights under the Fourth
Amendment to demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy (in
addition to an objective one).'74 Requiring a subjective expectation is
facially appealing as it would appear odd to hold that an applicant had
a reasonable expectation of privacy or personal choice in a matter
when that person had no actual expectation. Yet there are arguments
that counsel against such a requirement.
It has been repeatedly recognized, in both scholarship analyzing
the Halford judgment and the Fourth Amendment, that outside forces
can easily manipulate a person's subjective expectations. Take, for
example, "[a]n employer who informs employees at the workshop
door that they have no right to privacy, and may be watched or lis-
tened to at any time. . . .""I Commentators have argued that:
workplace privacy standards .. will invariably favour employer interests
over individual privacy, and will also become the 'norm' to be expected in
workplaces which do not have explicit privacy-related policies.
.. Ultimately the scope of privacy rights could be reduced to virtu-
ally nothing. This is a real danger of approaches which treat expectations
of privacy as a purely empirical concept, rather than takig, a normative
perspective based on the expectations of society as a whole.'
173. See supra Part 11.B and note 67.
174. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also
infra note 180.
175. Ford, supra note 6, at 31.
176. Hazel Oliver, Email and Internet Monitoring in the Workplace: Information Privacy
and Contracting-Out, 31 INDUS. L.J. 321, 332-33 (2002). This topic has been covered thor-
oughly elsewhere, to say the least. E.g., Gail Lasprogata et al., Regulation of Electronic Em-
ployee Monitoring: Identifying Fundamental Principles of Employee Privacy through a Com-
parative Study of Data Privacy Legislation in the European Union, United States and
Canada, 2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4, 1 65 (2004), at http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/-
04_STLR_4/index.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2005); Patricia Findlay & Alan McKinlay, Sur-
veillance, Electronic Communications Technologies and Regulation, 34 INDUS. REL. J. 305,
307-08 (2003); Aileen McColgan, Do Privacy Rights Disappear in the Workplace, 2003 EUR.
HuM. RTS. L. REV. 120, 123 (2003); Michael Ford, Two Conceptions of Worker Privacy, 31
INDUS. L.J. 135, 143-54 (2002); Craig & Oliver, supra note 62, at 55-56; Heather L. Hanson,
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In the context of the Fourth Amendment, Anthony Amsterdam has
similarly argued that "the government could diminish each person's
subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing half-hourly
on television that ... we [are] all forthwith being placed under com-
prehensive electronic surveillance."' 77 Of course he exaggerates, but
the point remains valid and could also be made with respect to en-
croachments on actual expectations of personal choice.
It should thus come as no surprise that despite requiring actual
expectations in the Fourth Amendment context, the U.S. Supreme
Court has on occasion tried to distance itself from the requirement.
Ironically, the first person to retreat was the author of the Katz opinion
that spawned the reasonable-expectations test. Just four years after
Katz, Justice Harlan stated in a dissenting opinion:
The analysis must, in my view, transcend the search for subjective ex-
pectations .... Our expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large
part reflections of laws that translate into rules the customs and values of
the past and present.
Since it is the task of the law to form and protect, as well as mirror and
reflect, we should not, as judges, merely recite the expectations and risks
without examining the desirability of saddling them upon society. 78
Later, a majority of the Supreme Court recognized that when an "indi-
vidual's subjective expectations had been 'conditioned' by influences
alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjec-
tive expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in ascer-
taining what the scope of Fourth Amendment protection was."' 179
Nevertheless, more recent cases continue to require some form of sub-
jective expectations. 1 0
The Fourth Amendment in the Workplace: Are We Really Being Reasonable?, 79 VA. L. REV.
243, 250-52 (1993); ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, WORKING DOCUMENT ON THE
SURVEILLANCE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN THE WORKPLACE, May 29, 2002, at 8-9,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/intemal-market/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2002/wp55_en.pdf. Simi-
larly, in his study of privacy, Raymond Wacks has stated that "a subjective test would clearly
be unacceptable." WACKS, supra note 54, at 26.
177. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 384 (1974).
178. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
179. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979).
180. E.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001); Bond v. United States, 529
U.S. 334, 338 (2000); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-40 (1988); California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986); see also I JOHN W. HALL JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.6,
at 78 (3d ed. 2000) ("Some recent cases, if taken to their logical conclusions, could ultimately
lead to unfortunate and unjustifiable results.").
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So what should be done with private life and Article 8? Given the
baggage noted above, the best approach to answering this question
might be to ask another, namely whether there exists any true value in
making actual expectations relevant. Perhaps the best argument for
why subjective expectations are at least somewhat relevant is that per-
sons should not be heard to complain about an invasion of private life
if they knowingly and voluntarily release private information'l-such
as by consenting to the publication of private photographs in a news-
paper-or knowingly and voluntarily relinquish a decision of personal
choice to another, such as by consenting to any necessary medical
treatment by a State hospital. These limitations for recovery make
sense, and I won't argue here that the Court should ignore them.
Nevertheless, I am of the view that it makes better sense to ana-
lyze those limitations under the doctrine of waiver of Convention
rights, rather than the rubric of expectations.'8 2 The benefits of this
approach are threefold. First, there already exists a body of Conven-
tion case law that acknowledges and defines the waiver of Convention
rights.'83 Second, the standard required by that case law is exacting as
it requires a knowing, voluntary (i.e., without constraint), and un-
equivocal waiver.'84 And finally, although not entirely clear under the
current Court jurisprudence, by analyzing the issue under waiver, it
would appear that any onus of proof on the matter would fall to the re-
spondent State and not the applicant.'85 As waiver appears a better
method of analysis, the Court should not require any proof of actual
expectations of privacy or personal choice to trigger Article 8.
181. See Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth
Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 968, 982-83 (1968).
182. Ignatius Rautenbach appears to advocate a similar approach when analyzing the
right to privacy under the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. See Ignatius M. Rau-
tenbach, The Conduct and Interests Protected by the Right to Privacy in Section 14 of the
Constitution, 2001 TYDSKRiF VIR DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE REG 115, 118 (2001), cited in
PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION, supra note 49, at 48 n.63.
183. E.g., Philis v. Greece, App. No. 19773/92, 48 (1996) (Commission Report),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2005); Pfeifer v. Austria,
227 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 37 (1992); Oberschlick v. Austria, 204 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 51
(1991); Colozza v. Italy, 89 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 28 (1985); Deweer v. Belgium, 35 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 9[ 49-54 (1980); Neumeister v. Austria, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 36
(1974); see generally RICHARD CLAYTON ET AL., THE LAW OF HuMAN RIGHTS §§ 6.148-.154
(2000); MERRILLS, supra note 27, at 177-85.
184. See the cases cited in the preceding footnote. See also Gillian S. Morris, Fundamen-
tal Rights: Exclusion by Agreement?, 30 INDus. L.J. 49, 53 (2001) (acknowledging that the
waiver requirements often pose high hurdles for a government to overcome but then arguing
that the Court should impose additional waiver requirements in the employment context).
185. Cf. Deweer, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 26 (stating that the State must plead and
prove the defense of failure to exhaust remedies).
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E. The Relation to Family Life, Home, and Correspondence
A final but peripheral issue that requires discussion concerns how
the reasonable-expectations test should interact with the other rights
recognized in Article 8, viz., family life, home, and correspondence.
The issue is an important one because applicants frequently complain
of a violation of private life in conjunction with one of these other
rights. Often the rights also overlap, such as when the government in-
tercepts a telephone call (correspondence) made from a house (home)
that concerns personal information (private life) about the caller.
Given that all these concepts conceivably involve the private sphere,
should the reasonable-expectations test judge the applicability of pri-
vate life alone or should it judge the remaining rights as well, as is
done in Katz? 186
Unfortunately, the Convention case law offers little guidance on
how to answer this question. The Convention institutions have not
always, when reviewing applications involving more than one Article
8 right, treated those rights separately or explained their relationship
to one another. 87 This occurred, for example, in Halford where the
Court was imprecise in separating and analyzing Article 8 claims
based on private life and correspondence. There are numerous other
examples of ambiguous rulings. 8 8 In all fairness, however, the Court
186. Also important is how the reasonable-expectations test should interact with rights
recognized or rejected in other articles or protocols of the Convention. The matter is particu-
larly acute with respect to personal choice claims as they are more susceptible to broad read-ings that could overlap with other articles and protocols. See Feldman, supra note 38, at 273.
John Merrills has noted that, with few exceptions, it
can be said that when the question is whether a particular article is applicable, thepresence of another article dealing with the subject is not a conclusive objection.
Because the Convention must be read as a whole, the same subject may sometimes
fall to be considered under more than one rubric.
MERRILLS, supra note 27, at 74; see also id. at 74-76 (discussing two recognized exceptions);
OVEy & WHrrE, supra note 18, at 32-34. Unfortunately, this topic merits more attention than
can be undertaken here, and I can only therefore refer the reader to some cases where theCourt has tried to resolve these sorts of conflicts. See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, 161Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989); Leander v. Sweden, 116 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1987); Johnston
v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986); Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R.(ser. A) (1985); Rasmussen v. Denmark, 87 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1984).
187. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 4, at 303 ("Both the Commission and the Court have
avoided laying down general understandings of what each of the items covers and, in some
cases, they have utilized the co-terminancy of them to avoid spelling out precisely which is or
are implicated when an applicant has invoked more than one of them in his claim that there
has been a violation of the Convention.").
188. E.g., Hatton v. United Kingdom, 2003-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 189, TIf 96-130 (2003)(mixing analysis of private life and family life); MG v. United Kingdom, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3,27-28 (2003) (same); Gaskin v. United Kingdom, 160 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 34-41(1989) (same); Klass v. Germany, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 91 41 (1978) (mixing analysis of
private life and correspondence).
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has in other cases carefully analyzed the Article 8 rights separately, 8 9
and one could argue in light of language from P.G. & J.H. that the
Court believes it should analyze the right to respect to home inde-
pendently of the reasonable-expectations test. 90 Nevertheless, the
Court's practices in this regard should be more transparent.
Interestingly, commentators also seem to disagree whether to treat
the rights in Article 8 in isolation or as a unitary whole. On the one
hand, there is the view of Louise Doswald-Beck (which undoubtedly
is shared by others) that the rights are separate and should be treated
as such. 19 1 Van Dijk & van Hoof appear to hold the contrary view,
however, in their treatise on the Convention:
Since any further definition [of Article 8] is lacking, the rights laid
down in this provision cannot be clearly distinguished from each other.
This is true in particular for the right to respect for private life on the one
hand, and the other three rights belonging to the private sphere on the
other hand. In fact, a clear delimitation is not necessary, since a complaint
concemin violation of the private sphere can be based on the provision as
a whole.'I
Ovey & White also appear to believe in a more unitary approach
to Article 8:
[T]he fact that the rights in Article 8 are grouped together in the same arti-
cle strengthens the protection given by that article, since each right is rein-
forced by its context. Thus, the right to respect for family life, the right to
privacy, and the right to respect for the home and correspondence may be
read together as guaranteeing collectively more than the sum of their parts.
S 19] 3". [T]hese notions should be considered together rather than in
isolation.
189. E.g., Keegan v. Ireland, 290 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 91 42-45 (1994) (defining family
life separately); Berrehab v. Netherlands, 138 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 20-21 (1988) (same);
Niemietz v. Germany, 251-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) U91 27-33 (1992) (analyzing private life,
home, and correspondence separately).
190. P.G. & J.H. v. United Kingdom, 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 546, 57 (stating that rea-
sonable expectations of privacy can be a significant factor to consider in cases where a "per-
son's private life is concerned by measures effected outside a person's home or private prem-
ises.") (emphasis added).
191. Doswald-Beck, supra note 6, at 284.
192. VAN DUK & VAN HOOF, supra note 19, at 489.
193. OVEY & WHITE, supra note 18, at 217-18 (yet they also later state that "there is no
single or embracing concept contained in Article 8"). In his survey of Article 8 claims in na-
tional jurisprudence, Nihal Jayawickrama also has noted that "[iut is not always possible to
precisely determine whether an alleged infringement of this right ought to be examined with
reference to one's 'privacy' (or private life) on the one hand, or the private sphere (i.e. 'fam-
ily', 'home' or 'correspondence') on the other." NniAL JAYAWICKRAMA, THE JUDICIAL
APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 602-03 (2002).
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Scholars embracing the unitary view would seemingly prefer a single
test to judge all the various rights. In our context, that would mean the
reasonable-expectations test should apply to all the rights in Article 8.
Of course, none of the above-noted comments was specifically
made in answer to the question I posed above, but I believe they,
along with the practices of the Court and (previously) Commission,
highlight an issue that the Court will have to clearly delineate and ex-
plain if it regularly employs the reasonable-expectations test. There
are three positions the Court could take:
1. Reasonable-expectations is the conclusive test for the en-
tirety of Article 8 and thus the sole method by which to dem-
onstrate the applicability of Article 8; 194
2. Reasonable-expectations is the conclusive test for the en-
tirety of Article 8, but the involvement of one or more of the
other more specific rights (i.e., family life, home, or corre-
spondence) creates a presumption that the applicant's expec-
tation of privacy or personal choice is reasonable, shifting the
burden to the Government to prove a consensus or emerging
consensus to the contrary; 195 or
3. Each right under Article 8 has its own independent mean-
ing such that, for example, the right to respect to home could
apply even though there was no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the activity that took place there.
Of the three options, it would seem the Court should discard the
first with little discussion. To adopt this approach, one must buy into
the idea that all the rights in Article 8 cannot be parsed (as has been
argued by some) or one must feel comfortable mixing rights that the
contracting States saw fit to list separately. I suppose, given that the
194. Most U.S. jurisdictions have adopted this approach in the Fourth Amendment con-
text. Reasonable-expectations is the determinative test and all the more specific rights in the
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution are not in themselves grounds to invoke the
Amendment. See supra Part lI.A.
195. Other U.S. jurisdictions have adopted an approach similar to this one. Although rea-
sonable-expectations is the determinative test, courts (or at least some of their members) pre-
sume a reasonable expectation of privacy in cases where correspondence is involved, see
United States v. Young, 350 F.3d 1302, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2003), or where the search in-
volves a home's interior that is not within plain view, see Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
34 (2001); United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 52-54 (2d Cir. 2002) (Meskill, J., concurring);
United States v. Vega, 221 F.3d 789, 796 (5th Cir. 2000).
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test proposed here could encompass matters normally thought to relate
to family life, home, and correspondence, that one could argue that the
first option may not do as much harm to the intentions of the contract-
ing States as initially appears. But I am not convinced. The second
option is more appealing but it has its own problems. I doubt whether
a presumption would work in this context given that it assumes the
Court would normally impose the burden of persuasion on the appli-
cant to prove an emerging consensus-a questionable premise in it-
self.196 Moreover, the Court would still have to define when the other
rights applied, thereby eliminating any judicial economy hoped to be
gained by using a single test. That leaves the last option. It emerges
as the most straightforward and favorable to applicants as it presents
them with four separate ways by which to demonstrate that Article 8
applies. It also appears the most consistent with the goals of the Con-
vention and some of the arguments I have set forth throughout this ar-
ticle. I would therefore prefer this option and hope the Court would as
well. In order for it to work, however, the Court will have to make
greater strides in consistently separating the Article 8 rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
I have in the preceding pages proposed a framework by which
private life can be assessed by asking whether the applicant had a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy or personal choice in the matter in-
volved. More importantly, I have argued that before the Court may
hold that an expectation is reasonable, the Court must find, at a mini-
mum, an emerging consensus among the member States (as deter-
mined by legal and societal norms) that recognizes the expectation in-
voked by the applicant. This method is pragmatic, dynamic and
arguably more principled than the Court's current approach. Along
the way, I have traced the seeds of the reasonable-expectations test in
the Court's jurisprudence (and elsewhere) and highlighted some of the
196. Judge Loucaides has argued:
[T]he wording of [former] Article 28 supports the view that no onus of proof is
cast exclusively on the applicant in respect of the establishment of the facts. Both
parties, the applicant and the respondent State, are on equal footing as regards their
duty to help the Commission to establish the facts with the aim of ascertaining the
truth in the case before it.
LouKis G. LOUCAIDES, Standards of Proof in Proceedings Under the European Convention
on Human Rights, in ESSAYS ON THE DEVELOPING LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 22, at
157, 165; see also Rogge, supra note 119, at 692 ("While at the initial stage of the proceeding
the individual applicant has to substantiate his or her complaint .... the Convention organs
do not in their examination of the merits of the application rely on the concept that the burden
of proof is by one or the other party.").
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principal issues the Court will encounter and have to resolve should it
choose to use reasonable expectations as its standard. Although the
Court will likely encounter some difficulty in administering the rea-
sonable-expectations test at first, I believe the Court can overcome
those difficulties in time as it becomes more accustomed to its use.
So, does the work-related smoking ban in Levanger, Norway im-
plicate private life under Article 8? The regional officials in Norway
seemed to think so, but they obviously are not the final arbiters of the
Convention. I imagine that if the Court ever heard the case that it
would be one of the tougher ones to decide. Assuming the Court ap-
plied the reasonable-expectations test, it would want to parse the
smoking ban into pieces and consider each of its aspects separately-
e.g., the applicant's expectations of personal choice in smoking in the
office versus smoking while on a break outside the office. I suspect
the Court would find the latter expectation to be reasonable without
much trouble, but that the former would be hotly contested. In any
event, we may soon have some guidance on how the case would come
out given that the Court is currently considering a similar issue. 97 It
will be interesting to see if the Court attempts to tackle the matter
within the rubric of reasonable expectations.
197. Aparicio Benito v. Spain, App. No. 36150/03 (2004) (communicating to the respon-
dent State the issue of whether a non-smoking prisoner's private life has been infringed be-
cause there are no non-smoking sections in the community areas of the prison), http://www.-
echr.coe.intlEng/Judgments.htm (French language only) (last visited Apr. 11, 2005).
Comparative guidance may also soon come from the United States where litigation is ex-
pected from a broader employer-imposed ban on smoking. See US Staff Lose Jobs OverSmoke Ban, BBC NEWS, Jan. 27, 2005 (describing an employer policy that bans employees
from smoking anywhere and anytime, including in their private lives), http://news.bbc.co.uk/-
2/hi/americas/4213441 .stm.
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